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ABSTRACT

In the twentieth century, the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico relied on their
confederate council—the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC)—to negotiate the demands
of the American political system. By organizing around a single, historic body, the
Pueblos were able to shield much of their tradition, secure a degree of political and
educational autonomy, protect their water rights, and increase their economic
development. The leaders of the AIPC were on the front line in negotiating with federal
and state authorities, and became adept at negotiating political networks to secure Pueblo
interests. Despite the historic conflicts within the Pueblos, the actions of the AIPC during
the twentieth century demonstrate that the Pueblos were keen to unite around a political
confederation, representing all Pueblos, when their joint interests were threatened.
Further, the AIPC became the single organization Pueblo people and tribal councils relied
on to protect, bolster, and even increase the sovereignty of the Pueblos, amidst a larger
Native sovereignty movement in the United States.
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1
INTRODUCTION

On 30 January 2007, Pueblo governors gathered at Santo Domingo Pueblo to
renew the bonds of friendship and political confederacy among New Mexico’s nineteen
Pueblos. A large contingent of female attendees, representing multiple generations,
cooked red chile, tamales, green chile stew, and Pueblo oven bread for a crowd of over
three hundred spectators—the largest remembered attendance for the ceremony.
Witnesses stood by to observe each of the governors sworn into his position as an officer
of the Pueblos’ confederate council, the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC). 1 Each of the
nineteen governors repeated the time-worn tradition of standing, expressing his
appreciation for the unity of the Pueblos, or saying a prayer in his native tongue. And
while in the early twenty-first century the AIPC has become a complex modern
organization, on this day the governors mostly refrained from discussing the ins and outs
of Pueblo politics. Instead, the council came together to remember the rich heritage of the
AIPC, which stretches back four hundred years. The council’s newly elected chairman,
Joe Garcia from Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo, reiterated the purpose of the AIPC. “The All
Indian Pueblo Council,” he said “is about finding solutions. . . . We are looking forward
to uniting together to come to these solutions.” 2
In the twentieth century, the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico relied on the AIPC
to conduct negotiations and represent Pueblo interests to the outside world. Between the
1

The All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC) was known before 1965 as the All Pueblo
Council (APC). The organization is one and the same. The difference in name indicates
only the signing of the organization’s constitution in 1965. Thus I use the title
interchangeably, dependent on the time frame in question.
2
“Inaugural Feast,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 30 January 2007, C-1.
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1920s and the mid 1970s, in particular, the AIPC became the most important element of
Pueblo government when dealing with external issues. The confederate council
developed a pragmatic governance of external Pueblo issues while fighting to protect
Pueblo tradition. Occasionally the AIPC’s defiance to protect their sovereignty was
perceived as militancy, as was the case when it fought to negotiate a favorable outcome
to the Pueblo land controversy in the 1920s. At other times, the AIPC struggled to sustain
momentum when campaigning to protect Pueblo sovereignty during the stifling federal
policies of the mid-century. Indeed the activity of the AIPC was frequently tempered by
federal aggression toward tribal structures until the council began administering its own
programs in the 1960s. The AIPC followed a philosophy termed by Pueblo historian Joe
Sando, as “cooperation for progress,” in which Pueblo leaders negotiated pragmatically
the demands of twentieth-century America with non-Indians in order to maintain and
protect tradition. 3
During the twentieth century the Pueblos faced a vast array of issues that required
the attention of the AIPC. In the 1920s, the Pueblos’ land base faced destruction at the
hands of Congress. The AIPC response to this issue led to a sustained period during
which non-Indians and progressive Pueblos questioned the legitimacy of the AIPC to
negotiate on behalf of all Pueblos. John Collier’s tribal-friendly reign as federal Indian
commissioner later encouraged a greater level of political activism from the AIPC, which
began to negotiate the local terms of the Pueblos’ water rights. During the midcentury,
federal policies designed to destroy all tribal entities suffocated the activism of the
council. And in the 1960s, during the rush for self-determination, the AIPC began to
3

Joe Sando, The Pueblo Indians (San Francisco, Calif.: The Indian Historian Press,
1976), 168.
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negotiate the Pueblos’ economic and educational independence, while asserting the
sovereign right of the Pueblos to determine their own futures.
Historians have tended to focus on the Pueblo revolt of 1680 as the sole instance
of solidarity among the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico. And although Pueblo
communities are internally and externally divergent, the historic existence of the AIPC
demonstrates that inter-Pueblo cooperation is nowhere near as unusual as historians have
previously suggested. In fact, the inter-Pueblo unity evident in the AIPC’s actions in the
twentieth century illustrates a culture of cooperation among New Mexico’s nineteen
Pueblos, which, despite its frays, is far deeper than has previously been suggested. The
issues facing the Pueblos continually changed, but the function of the AIPC was always
to provide a united face to the outside world that, by acting with external strength,
protected the traditional elements of Pueblo government, internally. Regardless of the
battleground, the AIPC conceived of its twentieth-century struggles around a single issue:
the historic independence of Pueblo communities and their continuing sovereign right to
self-government.
All current nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico are politically autonomous societies
that speak different languages, practice distinct religions, and observe unique cultures.
Within most Pueblos, however, there have historically been two systems of government.
In one, the cacique heads the traditional system. During the sixteenth-century conquest of
New Mexico, Spanish leaders coined the word “cacique,” meaning chief, or king, when
identifying the leader of each Pueblo. Along with the war chief and his assistants, the
cacique is responsible for all theocratic matters within Pueblo society. In the traditional
system, each position is held for life. After the Spaniards had established a presence in

4
northern New Spain, they introduced a second system of government to the Pueblos that
was answerable to the crown. The village governor stands at the helm of this system. The
governor is in charge of secular, normally external, matters for the Pueblo he serves. The
Spaniards awarded each Pueblo a silver-headed cane, to be handed to the governor
elected each year, normally at the new year, as a symbol of his authority to represent that
Pueblo. Over time the position of governor was “converted by the Pueblos into an
effective bulwark against intrusion by foreigners.” Today, governors continue to provide
a face to the outside world for each Pueblo. The cacique and his staff have traditionally
selected the governor each year, but today at Isleta, Laguna, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso,
Santa Clara, and Zuni Pueblos, the governor is elected by popular vote. 4
There is also a third system of government that exists between Pueblos: the AIPC,
or the “political arm of the Pueblos.” The AIPC has functioned as a “confederation of 19
autonomous pueblo governments, providing a united voice for dealing with other
governmental agencies.” 5 The AIPC consists of nineteen representatives; the governor of
each Pueblo is automatically appointed to the AIPC; and the nineteen governors have one
vote each to appoint the chairman, vice chairman, and secretary of the council every two
years. Due to the caciques’ selection of the governors in their respective Pueblos, the
traditional elders of each Pueblo maintain a connection to the council. 6 The AIPC, then,
has no power to govern the internal affairs of individual Pueblo communities. Instead, the

4

For a fuller discussion of the political structure of the Pueblos, see Joe Sando, Pueblo
Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian History (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Clear Light
Publishers, 1992), 13–18.
5
All Indian Pueblo Council Narrative, n.d., untitled folder, box 5, All Indian Pueblo
Council Papers, Pueblo Archives, Indian Pueblo Cultural Center, Albuquerque, New
Mexico [hereafter AIPC Papers-IPCC].
6
For the AIPC constitution signed 16 October 1965, refer to Sando, Pueblo Nations, 264.
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council has historically functioned as a single inter-Pueblo representative body that deals
with external issues affecting all Pueblos.
The council has been a part of the political structure of Pueblo life since perhaps
as early as the 1300s. Joe Sando states that, similarly to the Iroquois League, the All
Indian Pueblo Council is one of the oldest confederate governments in North America. 7
He suggests that the arrival of the Athabaskans in the Southwest compelled a measure of
unity between the Pueblos, and this unity gradually evolved into the formal organization
of today. 8 Before the Spanish settled in New Mexico, there were at least thirty-five (and
probably many more) individual Pueblo villages, populated by many tens of thousands of
men and women. 9 According to Sando, a mutual Pueblo need to work in unison to fend
off the newly arrived raiders led to the formation of the council. The AIPC went on to act
also as an unofficial inter-Pueblo jury, resolving disputes when there was a problem in
any village. 10 Sando suggests that the first evidence of the council’s existence can be
traced to July 1598, when thirty-eight leaders met at Santo Domingo Pueblo, gave Juan
de Oñate permission to settle on the Rio Grande, and swore allegiance to the Spanish
throne. Soon after, Oñate established a settlement near San Juan. 11

7

Sando, Pueblo Nations, 263.
Archaeologist David Brugge has suggested that by 1300, the Apacheans were on the
northern periphery of the Southwest area. See David Brugge, “Navajo Prehistory and
History to 1850,” in Southwest, ed. Alfonso Ortiz, vol. 10 of Handbook of North
American Indians, ed. William C. Sturtevant, 20 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian
Institution, 1983), 490.
9
For a more full discussion on the demographics of the Pueblos before contact, and for
more detailed numbers, see Albert H. Schroeder, “Pueblos Abandoned in Historic
Times,” in Southwest, ed. Alfonso Ortiz, vol. 9 of Handbook of North American Indians,
ed. William C. Sturtevant, 20 vols. (Washington, D. C.,: Smithsonian Institution, 1979).
10
Sando, Pueblo Nations, 263.
11
Sando, Pueblo Indians, 210–11.
8

6
The precise history of the AIPC before the twentieth century is uncertain. A
councilman of Santo Domingo in the late twentieth century explained, “the details of the
history are so sacred, they have been kept a secret. The heart of the AIPC is buried at
Santo Domingo Pueblo, depicting a bone which lies across the state of New Mexico.” 12
While there are many moments that can be pointed to as the beginning of the AIPC, as
time passed and the twentieth century neared, the structure of the council became
increasingly formal. Certainly, the Pueblos came together politically long before the
Bursum bill struggle of 1922.
Despite the guarded history of the AIPC, late-nineteenth-century AIPC action
indicates the role that the council fulfilled before the twentieth century. In 1889, for
example, the Pueblos suffered many deaths at the hands of an influenza outbreak
originating in Russia. The Pueblos vowed that in future they would meet in times of
crisis, and more when necessary, to help one another. 13 Pablo Abeita of Isleta, who was
born in 1871, remembered that the AIPC was “already in force” when he was a child.
“The Indians would meet at the request or at the asking of any Pueblo for matters
pertaining to the welfare of the Pueblo Indians,” he noted. Indeed, Abeita was a member
of the council by the age of eighteen, and he experienced a tumultuous conflict in 1894.
At this time the AIPC intervened in a land dispute between San Felipe and Santo
Domingo Pueblos. Described as a “warpath” by Abeita, the conflict resulted in some
deaths. The AIPC met at San Felipe to mediate the dispute, and ordered San Felipe to pay

12

Quoted in Sally Hyer, “Remembering Santa Fe Indian School, 1890–1990” (Phd diss.,
University of New Mexico, 1994), 285.
13
“The All-Pueblo Council: A Veteran Confederation,” folder 23, box 4, Sophie D.
Aberle Papers, 1913–1987, MSS 509 BC, Center for Southwest Research, University
Libraries, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque [hereafter Aberle Papers, CSWR].
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two hundred dollars in damages to Santo Domingo. Abeita remembers that the event
brought the Pueblos closer together than they had been, and they vowed to be more
responsive toward one another in the future. 14
There is a surprising lack of historical literature on the nineteen Pueblos of New
Mexico and their confederate council in the twentieth century. 15 Historians such as J.
Manuel Espinosa, Ramón A. Gutiérrez, John Kessell, and Carroll L. Riley have
successfully illuminated Pueblo history by focusing on the rich dynamics of SpanishPueblo relations from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In this historiography, the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680 has acted as a massive historical watershed. 16 The concentration
of research on Spanish-Pueblo relations, however, has meant that Pueblo history after the
establishment of U.S. power in New Mexico in 1848 is quite sparse. Some historians
have tackled questions over the legal status of the Pueblos under the United States in the
nineteenth century. 17 Yet, twentieth-century political history, if written at all, has rarely
been told from the Pueblos’ perspective. Only Joe Sando of Jemez Pueblo and James

14

See Pablo Abeita’s statement in All Pueblo Council meeting minutes, September 1929,
Santo Domingo, p. 9, reel 8, microfilm, John Collier Papers [hereafter Collier Papers];
and “The All-Pueblo Council: A Veteran Confederation.”
15
There is, however, an abundance of anthropological studies on the Pueblos. For
example see Edward Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America (1970; repr., Prospect
Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983); or Ortiz, ed., Southwest.
16
Most recently, J. Manuel Espinosa, The Pueblo Indian Revolt of 1696 and the
Franciscan Missions in New Mexico: Letters of the Missionaries and Related Documents
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came,
the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–
1846 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); John Kessell, Pueblos,
Spaniards, and the Kingdom of New Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2008); and Caroll L. Riley, The Kachina and the Cross: Indians and Spaniards in the
Early Southwest (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999).
17
See, for example, Deborah A. Rosen, “Pueblo Indians and Citizenship in Territorial
New Mexico,” New Mexico Historical Review 78 (winter 2003): 1–28.
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Vlasich have provided Pueblo perspective in the twentieth century by focusing
respectively on cultural and agricultural factors. 18
This is not to say that historians have ignored the Pueblo story altogether in the
twentieth century. In fact, elements of the twentieth century have been covered in quite
extraordinary depth. A few historians have subjected the Bursum bill, the Pueblo Lands
Board Act, and the political context of these measures to great scrutiny. Yet within their
examination of the land battle, historians have paid scant attention to the Pueblo people
who helped determine their own futures. 19 Instead, they have focused on Stella Atwood
and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), John Collier and the American
Indian Defense Association (AIDA), the political and artistic circles in Santa Fe and
Taos, or the politicians who imposed the Bursum bill on New Mexico’s nineteen
Pueblos. 20 Despite the tendency of historians to focus on the white men and women of
non-Indian organizations—illuminating a rich history on wider America at this time—the
land struggle acutely affected local Pueblo communities. Within and between these

18

Sando, Pueblo Nations; Joe Sando, Pueblo Profiles: Cultural Identity through
Centuries of Change (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Clear Light Publishers, 1998); and James A.
Vlasich, Pueblo Indian Agriculture (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2005).
19
Only Joe Sando places the Indians at the center of this picture. See Sando, Pueblo
Profiles and Sando, Pueblo Nations.
20
See, for example, Karin L. Huebner, “An Unexpected Alliance: Stella Atwood, the
California Clubwomen, John Collier, and the Indians of the Southwest, 1917–1934,”
Pacific Historical Review 78 (August 2009): 337–366; Lawrence C. Kelly, The Assault
on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1983); Arrell Morgan Gibson, The Santa Fe and Taos
Colonies: Age of the Muses, 1900–1942 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983);
and Kenneth R. Philp, “Albert B. Fall and the Protest from the Pueblos, 1921-23,”
Arizona and the West 12 (Autumn 1970): 237–254. Another key moment of historical
focus has been the return of Taos Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo. See, for example, Andrew
Graybill, “Strong on the Merits and Powerfully Symbolic”: The Return of Blue Lake to
Taos Pueblo,” New Mexico Historical Review 76 (April 2001): 125–160.
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communities, the Pueblos organized around the AIPC, a body that historians have
typically mentioned only in passing. 21 Yet the AIPC and its leaders were crucial to the
outcome of this struggle. Only Tisa Wenger, a historian of religious history, has begun to
remedy the lack of Pueblo perspective during this critical time in her analysis of the
Pueblo fight for religious freedom in the 1920s. 22
Historians Francis Paul Prucha, Elmer Rusco, and Edward Spicer have incorrectly
suggested that the Bursum bill coalition formed in 1922 “led to the establishment of the
All-Pueblo Council.” 23 According to Rusco, “Inter-Pueblo cooperation goes all the way
back to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, and there had been irregular and ad hoc meetings of
representatives of all or most Pueblos for some time before the 1920s.” 24 These informal
gatherings, however, were likely pre-arranged AIPC meetings that had traditionally met
“each month, since time immemorial.” 25 Despite these inaccuracies, Prucha, Rusco, and
Spicer do highlight an important moment of cooperation between all nineteen Pueblos
and outside organizations in twentieth-century Pueblo history. For this moment became

21

Historians have tended to mention the AIPC as a political body established by John
Collier in 1922. See, for example, Lawrence C. Kelly, “John Collier and the Pueblo
Lands Board Act,” New Mexico Historical Review 58 (January 1983): 6.
22
Tisa Joy Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy
and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press,
2009).
23
Elmer Rusco, A Fateful Time: The Background and Legislative History of the Indian
Reorganization Act (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 23–24; Francis Paul
Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2
vols., combined and unabridged (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 799; and
Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States
on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967),
173.
24
Rusco, A Fateful Time, 23–24.
25
Benny Atencio, U.S. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs, Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearings on H.R. 15419 and
Related Bills, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 50.
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formative for the AIPC in many ways, providing Pueblo leaders with the tools required to
continue negotiating Pueblo sovereignty for many decades.
Despite this focus on the political wranglings of the Bursum bill, historians have
little considered the events from the passage of the Pueblo Lands Board Act, in 1924, to
and including the Indian Reorganization Act, in 1934, through the final settlements of the
Pueblo Lands Board (PLB) in 1938. An analysis of this time frame demonstrates that the
Pueblos’ land and water struggles did not end with the legislation of the Pueblo Lands
Board Act. Certainly the Bursum-bill struggle was formative for the AIPC. In particular,
the relationship the APC formed with soon-to-be federal Indian commissioner John
Collier—described by Vine Deloria Jr. as the first non-Indian to “understand, appreciate,
articulate, and fight zealously” for Indian tradition—became vital to the Pueblos landand water-based future. 26 In many ways the defeat of the Bursum bill was only the
beginning of the Pueblos’ story and the role of the AIPC in twentieth-century New
Mexico. The Pueblos’ land and water struggles continued into the 1930s and beyond, and
necessitated that the APC grow as a representative body. Similarly, because of the federal
government’s campaign to end tribal sovereignty in the mid-century, historians have
given almost no consideration to the actions of the Pueblos at this time. Vlasich does
cover this period in his work on Pueblo agriculture, yet he gives little scope to the
political ramifications of this difficult time period.
While the majority of Native American political histories have been written from
the perspective of the federal government, the mid-to-late twentieth century has recently

26

Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, (1984; repr. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 41.
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been scrutinized from a different perspective. 27 More recently scholars of Native history
have started to focus on twentieth-century events, emphasizing activist Red Power
movements since World War II. Authors such as Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior
have commonly argued that Red Power movements led by American Indian Movement
(AIM) after the Alcatraz occupation of 1969–1971 attained from the federal government
self-determination for Native communities. 28 There is, however, a growing body of
literature that diverges from the dominant discourse of this period. Charles Wilkinson’s
Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005) and Daniel Cobb’s Native
Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty (2008) have very recently
argued that from the 1950s onward, Native tribes and their political leaders orchestrated a
modern Native American movement for tribal sovereignty and political selfdetermination. 29
When the AIPC is viewed alongside what Wilkinson describes as a “modern tribal
sovereignty movement” in the twentieth century, the historical significance of the AIPC

27

For an overview of Native American federal policy, see Prucha, The Great Father. For
twentieth-century federal Indian policy, see Kenneth R. Philp, foreword by Francis Paul
Prucha, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1977); Deloria Jr. and Lytle, The Nations Within; and Vine Deloria Jr.,
ed., American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1985).
28
For example see Troy Johnson, The Occupation of Alcatraz: Indian Self-Determination
and the Rise of Indian Activism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); and Paul
Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior, Like A Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz
to Wounded Knee (New York: New Press, 1996).
29
Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Daniel Cobb and Loretta Fowler, eds.,
Beyond Red Power: American Indian Politics and Activism Since 1900 (Santa Fe,
N.Mex.: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007); Charles Wilkinson, Blood
Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2005).
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becomes apparent. 30 The AIPC can be understood in a context where “tribal members
might discuss their predicaments, assess the alternatives offered by both traditional and
innovative political structures, and chart a course of action for the future.” 31 Wilkinson
and other scholars have usually pointed to the National Congress of American Indians,
established in 1944, as the root of this movement. The AIPC narrative, however, suggests
that the Pueblos’ campaign for tribal sovereignty began far earlier. In Beyond Red Power:
American Indian Politics and Activism since 1900, Daniel M. Cobb and Loretta Fowler
show that Native activism was common from the beginning of the twentieth century.
From the 1920s onward, I argue, the AIPC conceived of battles over land, water, and
political authority as attacks on the sovereignty of the Pueblos. Further, the AIPC steadily
led a campaign with a consistent message to protect Pueblo sovereignty from the 1920s to
the 1970s.
Ultimately, the story of the AIPC, as a modern Native American institution
fighting for Pueblo sovereignty, remains to be written. This work offers a beginning to
writing that history by examining how the AIPC functioned during the twentieth century
and aims to fill in some gaps in Pueblo history during this period. It pays particular
attention to the development of the institution itself, to its chairmen during the crucial
period of the mid to late twentieth century, to its interactions with federal institutions, and
to the council-sponsored programs that enlarged the self-determination of Pueblo
communities. I conceive of the AIPC as a Native American community or “active node in

30

Wilkinson, Blood Struggle, xiv.
Frederick E. Hoxie, “Missing the Point: Academic Experts and American Indian
Politics,” in Beyond Red Power: American Indian Politics and Activism Since 1900, ed.
Daniel Cobb and Loretta Fowler (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: School for Advanced Research
Press, 2007), 26. See also, Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America.
31

13
a network of assessment, thought, and action.” The narrative focuses on the role of the
leaders—and particularly the chairman—of the AIPC during this time because, as
Frederick Hoxie astutely observes, Native political leaders during the twentieth century
should be considered activists. Due to the unique position of tribes within America, these
leaders “could not avoid acting within the boundaries of American political life.” As was
the case elsewhere across Indian Country, AIPC leaders waged campaigns “to support the
interests of indigenous communities, but their successes were won through interaction
with the legal institutions of the United States.” 32 As leaders of a prominent outwardfacing indigenous institution, AIPC chairmen were on the front line of the modern tribal
sovereignty movement.

32

Hoxie, “Missing the Point,” 30.
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CHAPTER ONE
The All Pueblo Council’s Formative Years: Pueblo Land Rights, Religious Freedom,
and Political Autonomy in the 1920s

On an early February morning in 1921, on the outskirts of Tesuque Pueblo, New
Mexico, before the sun had fully risen over the snow-capped Sangre de Cristo Mountains
to the east, over twenty-five men marched toward the fenced boundary of a nearby
rancher’s land. On arrival, encouraged by the defiance and leadership of their twentyfive-year-old lieutenant governor, Martin Vigil, the men from the Tewa Pueblo began
tearing down the fencing and uprooting the fence posts that demarcated the boundary of
the E. D. Newman Ranch. Newman soon arrived at the scene and, smiling wryly at Vigil,
remarked, “you meant what you said.” “Yes,” Vigil replied, “I’m not talking behind a
bush, I’m telling you right off.” 33
A few weeks earlier, Vigil had approached Newman on his ranch while he was
installing a new fence across land that the members of Tesuque Pueblo considered theirs.
With the backing of his governor, Elias Suazo—Vigil’s father-in-law—Vigil told
Newman, in Spanish, not to fence this place. Reiterating the Pueblo’s historic ownership
of the area, Vigil exclaimed, “This land is ours.” Believing he had purchased the land
only a few months previously, Newman considered his actions legitimate. “This is my
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land,” he rebutted. “I’m not going to move.” 34 Vigil refused to argue: “I don’t want to
talk, I’m just giving you orders by the governor, remove your fence and that’s the end of
it, we will have no trouble.” Newman refused to take down his fence. Hence, a couple of
weeks later and after much apprehensive discussion within the Tesuque community and
tribal council, Vigil returned to remove the fencing with other men for support. 35 By the
day’s end, the Tesuque men had carried off three-and-a-half miles of fencing from two
separate ranches. 36
The owner of the second ranch, Mr. Healy, whose fence the men also tore down,
threatened the party from Tesuque with a shotgun. He promised that the first Indian who
entered his property and refused to leave on demand was “going to stop a bullet.” 37 Vigil
was confident that the ranchers were in the wrong and apparently laughed this threat off:
“He can’t kill us all, let him shoot if he wants to.” Police cars and Office of Indian Affairs
(OIA) agents from nearby Santa Fe soon arrived, along with Pueblo lawyer Francis C.
Wilson, who advised Vigil and his cohort to cease their actions. They eventually did so,
but Vigil vowed to establish legally who owned this disputed land once and for all: He
34
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recalled, “For the sake of my land and the sake of my people . . . if we don’t do
something right now, pretty soon we’ll be surround[ed by] the Spanish with non-Indians,
Anglos, everybody come and help themself [sic].” 38 The local newspaper, the Santa Fe
New Mexican, portrayed the Indians as land grabbers and declared that Tesuque Pueblo
was “on the Warpath—more or less.” 39 Other ranchers in the area, “a representative
bunch of red blooded true Americans,” armed themselves in response. 40 Having heard the
newspaper reports, San Juan Pueblo (now Ohkay Owingeh) governor José Ramos
Archuleta led a group of men, ready to fight, to Tesuque a few days later. He told Vigil,
“We are standing behind you . . . the Tewa people, we want to help you.” 41 Vigil assured
them that there was no war: “we’re fighting not with guns or arrow or anything [sic].”
Instead, he told them, Tesuque was going to fight the incursions onto Tesuque land
through official channels. 42
This incident at Tesuque represented a much larger and long-running issue over
Pueblo land rights across New Mexico. New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos had lost
thousands of acres of land to Anglo and Hispanic settlers since Europeans had first
arrived in the valleys of New Mexico, beginning in the sixteenth century. In particular,
since the U.S. annexation of the Southwest in 1848, settlers had erected fences adjacent
to, and in many cases on, Pueblo lands. The rising tide of controversy over this issue, and
the potential for violence, ultimately forced the federal government to act on the longstanding issue of land rights across New Mexico. In 1922, Congress passed the Bursum
38
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bill, legislation that threatened to resolve most claims in favor of non-Indians. Stirred by
the possibility of losing further lands, the APC began meeting regularly and formed a
powerful coalition of Pueblo and non-Indian interests. With the help of community leader
John Collier and clubwoman Stella Atwood—both Anglos—the APC coalition was able
to defeat the Bursum bill and force the passing of the more favorable Pueblo Lands Board
Act in 1924.
During the 1920s, the APC formalized itself as the official representative
confederate council of all of the New Mexico Pueblos. 43 Significantly, the Bursum bill
fight and the wider issue of Pueblo land rights affected all nineteen Pueblos. The
willingness of the Pueblos to unite with one another demonstrates that the Pueblos could
achieve great success in protecting their homelands and their culture through political
confederacy. (And further, the cooperation evident in the APC at this time, and
throughout the twentieth century proves that the Pueblos have been keen to act in unison
when their collective interest is threatened from outsiders.) Similarly, the APC’s
willingness to co-opt a white coalition set a precedent that lasted throughout the twentieth
century. The APC remained wary of individuals and organizations outside Pueblo
society, but after working closely with Collier and Atwood during the Bursum bill
struggle, the APC continued to cultivate meaningful political relationships with outsiders
for the remainder of the century. These relationships ultimately proved invaluable in
protecting Pueblo interests and preserving fundamental elements of Pueblo culture. This
chapter in Pueblo history also acted as the springboard for the APC to become the most
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active and important element in collective Pueblo government during the twentieth
century.
This is not to say that the APC stood unchallenged as a representative council of
the Pueblos. The strength and success of the APC during and following on from the
Bursum-bill fight brought the council into conflict with other groups with differing
interests. First, during the Bursum-bill negotiations, the Pueblos’ coalition became
wracked by in-fighting between various non-Indian organizations. Ultimately, one of the
organizations, the New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs (NMAIA), who had
previously backed the APC’s effort to defeat the Bursum bill, challenged the authority of
the APC to speak for all Pueblos. While the APC had invited outside groups to represent
the Pueblos' interests, these outsiders began to question the degree to which the APC
represented Pueblo society and whether it operated independently. Second, individuals
from various progressive factions within the Pueblo community formed the Council of
Progressive Pueblo Indians. Backed by white reformers who wanted to see American
Indians assimilate into the dominant culture, this council attempted to discredit the
authority of the APC by denouncing its leaders to the Indian Office as backward
traditionalists who governed the Pueblos with an iron fist. And last, in 1926, the Indian
Office created the U.S. Pueblo Indian Council to rival the APC as an inter-Pueblo body.
This new council was an attempt by the Indian Office to corral the members of the APC
in a new forum controlled by the federal government. The Indian Office was perturbed at
the actions of the APC because its members did not reflect the assimilationist line of
national Indian policy.
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In many ways, the challenges to the authority of the APC during this time
strengthened the significance of the council. The APC emerged in 1928 as an
organization that could hold court with federal and state authorities and command respect
from the Pueblo people of New Mexico. The struggles over land and the political
conditions surrounding these events necessarily demanded a strong and unified response
from the Pueblo community as a whole. Within this, the leaders of the APC utilized the
position of the confederate council to transform the institution into a powerful regional
organization. In so doing, the APC began to emerge as the most important element of the
Pueblos’ political structure in dealing with outsiders.
The story of the APC during this period has important national consequences. The
work of the APC in the 1920s can be considered a direct Native reaction against the
general assimilation line of the Indian Office at the turn of the twentieth century. The
APC was made up of more traditional but not completely conservative leaders who
fought to maintain cultural continuity in Pueblo society. By expressing their right to
represent the Pueblos independently from the federal government, they were also fighting
assimilation. And further, their actions and successes in the 1920s and their relationship
with Collier helped shepherd in a new day for Indians across America. The APC
demonstrated that resistance to the dominant culture could be achieved by using political
confederacy between Indians and with the help of sympathetic outsiders.
The action of Vigil and his Tesuque brothers in 1922 was only the latest incident
in a centuries-long battle. By this time, the land situation in New Mexico had grown from
a local issue to a state and federal embarrassment. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
signed in 1848 after the U.S.-Mexico War and the U.S. annexation of northern Mexico,
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guaranteed the Pueblos their land from the United States. The Pueblos resided on land
that the Spanish empire had granted to its Native citizens. 44 The Pueblos had lived
alongside their Hispanic neighbors, predominantly on tightly packed fertile strips along
the rivers of arid New Mexico. By the 1920s, the Pueblos still claimed historic ownership
of their lands. Yet some Anglo and Hispanic settlers and squatters claimed they resided
legally on Pueblo lands. Whether the Pueblos had legally relinquished the title to their
lands, and thus whether the settlers were there legally, was a situation very much
complicated by the changing citizenship status of the Pueblos under Spanish, Mexican,
and then American rule.
The Pueblos were wards of the Spanish crown, but Mexico had granted the
Pueblos citizenship in 1821. This status implied that the Pueblos could sell their land to
non-Indians as well as purchase new lands. Complicating the legal position of the
Pueblos under the United States, however, was their distinct position within the federal
government’s categorization of Indians owing to their relationship to Spain and then
Mexico. Similarly, because of their sedentary and agricultural lifestyle, the Pueblos
defied the general assumption held by the federal government that all Indians were
savages, and thus noncitizens. 45
In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on United States v. Joseph, which brought
some legal definition to the Pueblos' position within America. The Joseph decision
confirmed that the Pueblos were indeed able to hold title to their land, for they “hold their
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lands by a right superior to that of the United States”: the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Further, the court considered the Pueblos “too civilized to warrant federal protection.” 46
The decision left the Pueblos’ land susceptible to exploitation by non-Indians for the next
twenty-five years. 47
In 1913, the U.S. Supreme Court once more weighed in on the land situation in
New Mexico when ruling on United States vs. Sandoval. The opinion of the court on this
occasion concluded that despite the Pueblos’ sedentary and peaceful lifestyle, they were
“nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government . . . adhering to
primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism . . . they are
essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.” 48 While the language of this
decision was derogatory toward the Pueblos, the Sandoval decision ruled that the Pueblos
were indeed Indians, and thus could not alienate their lands. Sandoval eventually
provided the Pueblos with a legal foundation to challenge the trespasses onto their land,
for these violations contradicted the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Hispanic
and Anglo settlers had undoubtedly bought and sold land on Pueblo property, in many
ways because they assumed the Pueblos were citizens, as the Spanish affirmed. Santa
Clara anthropologist Edward Dozier, however, doubted that “few, if any Pueblo Indians
had ever sold land grants.” 49 Regardless of what had previously passed, the Sandoval
decision was a major contributing factor to the growing land tensions in the 1910s.
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The APC, too, was active during the Sandoval period, and fully aware of the
growing issue of land rights affecting its constituents. On 18 May 1911, the APC met at
Santa Clara Pueblo to request from the U.S. Indian Commissioner that the federal
government commission a survey of all Pueblo lands. In its request to Commissioner
Robert G. Valentine, the APC complained, “Every year somebody moves the boundaries
in upon our lands, in some cases several miles.” The APC pointed out, “All of us have
lost tracts of valuable land which were honestly ours under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.” 50 The APC pointed out the power of its political confederation: “We have
organized into a federation of tribes and have had there [sic] meetings which have
resulted in a great good to us all. We study our condition from every point of view and
we believe we have inaugurated a new upward movement which all New Mexico, white
and Indian, will feel.” 51 The APC closed its appeal by inviting the Indian Office to send a
representative to its next meeting at Santo Domingo Pueblo.
In 1914, the federal government did indeed commission a survey of Pueblo lands
in an attempt to establish how much Pueblo land non-Indians claimed. The Joy Survey
may not have been a direct response to the APC appeal, but, more likely, a federal
response to the Sandoval decision of the previous year. The Joy Survey aimed to provide
the special attorney to the Pueblos, Francis Wilson, with “systematic, definite information
about non-Indian claims to confirmed Pueblo land, so that he could begin the process of
quieting title in the pueblos to their ancestral homes.” 52 Martin Vigil, who later led
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Tesuque Pueblo members to tear down contested fences on adjoining land, remembered
the arrival of the survey team. He stated that no Pueblos “knew anything about it, nobody
consult with the people [sic].” 53 The Pueblos and their supporters claimed that the
surveyors “accepted any non-Indian claim, no matter how baseless or ludicrous.” The
surveyors concluded that there were around three thousand non-Indian claims to
“patented Pueblo land.” Perhaps equally significant, the survey indicated that non-Indian
claims represented prime, irrigated land. 54 And while the federal government maintained
that the survey was not official and did not represent title to the lands, by recognizing the
claims of non-Indians, the Joy Survey set a dangerous precedent.
Soon, non-Indian claimants began erecting fences on contested land using the
boundaries recognized in the Joy Survey as a guideline. Some settlers began to apply to
the Department of the Interior for patents to lands that the Joy Survey suggested were
theirs. 55 Vigil remembers that one particular fence erected at this time in Tesuque Pueblo
represented fifty-five acres that the Pueblo considered theirs. In response, Tesuque elders
began to question, “Why don’t we fight for our land or get some help?” Tesuque Pueblo
leaders had little knowledge of what recourse they had legally, however, and had
previously lived relatively peacefully with their non-Indian neighbors.56
Between the Joy Survey and the actions of Vigil in February 1922, the land
situation became increasingly untenable for Pueblo communities. In May 1920, a U.S.
House subcommittee on Indian Affairs visited Tesuque as part of a nationwide
investigation into the operation of the Indian Office. Two Pueblo leaders used this
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hearing as an opportunity to highlight the growing land crises that had arisen, particularly
since the Joy Survey. Representing seven of the Northern Pueblos, Ramos Archuleta of
San Juan claimed, “to-day [sic] we have less than half of the lands contained in that
survey of the patent.” 57 And further, non-Indians “live inside some of our land, and, of
course, we want the Government to help us out in that question.” Porfirio Montoya of
Taos Pueblo echoed Archuleta’s sentiments, claiming that his people, too, had lost
significant land since the Joy Survey. 58 Importantly, both men became vocal leaders for
the APC in the imminent Bursum-bill struggle, demonstrating that the Pueblos were both
conscious and active on the issue of land well before John Collier and other white
outsiders entered the fray surrounding Pueblo land. About eighteen months later, Vigil
and other Tesuque men took the growing Pueblo frustrations out on fences that were
erected in response to the Joy Survey. The message was clear: the Pueblos would no
longer accept encroachment onto land that was legally theirs. Vigil vowed to establish
legally who owned the disputed land, once and for all.
After bloodshed was only “narrowly averted” at Tesuque, the local impetus to
resolve this particular incident, and the wider problem, ballooned. Consequently, there
was a four-day court hearing in Santa Fe to hear the opinions of all parties. 59 By this
point, however, it was unlikely that any number of court hearings would resolve the
Pueblos' land nightmare. In July 1922, Congress attempted to quiet the growing
frustration when Sen. Holm O. Bursum of New Mexico drafted the Bursum bill. The bill
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contained many dangerous provisions for the Pueblos. Significantly, those non-Indian
claimants who could provide “secondary evidence” of possession of their lands before 10
June 1900 would have been entitled to a decree from a local court that gave them title to
the land. Similarly, the Bursum draft gave the Pueblos very limited water rights, and
dictated that they correspond with the courts before irrigating any new acres. Perhaps
most disturbingly for the Pueblos, the bill also directed the New Mexico District Court to
accept all Joy Survey boundaries as final. Most importantly, the legislation placed on the
Pueblos the onus to provide evidence of continuous ownership of their lands. Congress
quickly pushed the legislation through before the summer recess. 60 The Bursum bill
would have officially handed virtually all contested lands to non-Indian claimants.
Non-Indian organizations and individuals began rallying to the Pueblos’ cause.
The General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), a rather conservative communitybased women’s philanthropic organization with substantial lobbying power, formed a
standing committee on Indian welfare in 1921. The committee was designed to improve
the economic conditions of Indians nationwide and, with federal cooperation, aid them in
regaining land rights. The GFWC appointed Atwood, who had a close relationship with
Hopi Pueblo, chair of the newly established committee. Quite separately, in the winter of
1920–21, community organizer John Collier made a visit to Taos Pueblo and fell in love
with what he considered the communal and mystic way of life the Tiwa Pueblo practiced.
In July 1921, Atwood and Collier met in Salt Lake City at a GFWC meeting, where the
pair realized their mutual concern for Native American tribes and the Pueblos in
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particular. The following summer, Atwood appointed Collier the Indian field agent of the
GFWC. According to historian Karin L. Huebner, in fall 1922 Atwood became aware of
the Bursum bill and informed Collier of the pending legislation, and “together they
launched a publicity campaign to defeat it.” 61
Back in New Mexico, the Pueblos also began organizing politically. Pablo Abeita,
a prominent member of Isleta Pueblo, an Indian Office judge, and long-time APC
delegate, began rousing opposition to the Bursum bill and was soon joined by Collier. 62
In September and October 1922, Collier and Abeita traveled to many of New Mexico’s
Pueblos in an attempt to bring the bill to each Pueblo’s attention. 63 When passing through
Tesuque, Collier stopped by Governor Suazo’s house, where Vigil later remembered
meeting Collier for the first time. Vigil felt that their conversation was unremarkable and
was wary of informing this strange-looking white man about the problems Tesuque and
other Pueblos had encountered. According to Vigil, Collier looked “like a tramp” and
struck him as the “nervous type.” 64 Nonetheless, this was one of the first moments in a
relationship between Collier and the Pueblos that would span over many decades and
help protect the most important elements of Pueblo life and culture from Anglo
encroachment.
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After Collier had journeyed farther south, Cochiti, Santo Domingo, and Isleta
Pueblos organized an APC meeting at Santo Domingo Pueblo on 5 November 1922 to
thrash out the Pueblo response to the Bursum bill. 65 At this historic meeting chaired by
Charlie Kie of Laguna Pueblo, 121 delegates from twenty Pueblos, including the
abandoned Pecos, attended, along with a number of key members of the Indian Office,
Pueblo lawyer Francis C. Wilson, and other white friends of the Pueblos such as Collier.
After a lengthy general discussion and a smaller, private, Pueblo-only deliberation lasting
two or three hours, the APC drafted “An Appeal by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to
the People of the United States,” which was then read to the wider group in English,
Spanish, Keresan, Tewan, and Zunian. The appeal noted the urgency of the threat facing
the Pueblos: “We have reached a point where we must either live or die.” 66 The
document was unanimously adopted and signed by all Pueblo delegates present. At
Collier’s recommendation, the council also agreed to send a number of delegates on a
high-profile trip to the Northeast. The meeting represented a powerful declaration of
cooperation between the Pueblos. Even though this was not the APC’s first meeting—by
any means—Collier concluded, “Henceforth they intend to stand together for mutual
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aid.” 67 Indeed the Pueblos’ willingness to accept the help of Collier, Atwood, and their
respective organizations was a significant step towards larger cooperation among Pueblos
and Anglos.
In late 1922 and into early 1923, Collier and Atwood began publicizing the
Pueblos’ cause. Collier used Survey magazine and Sunset Magazine to highlight the
deficiencies of the Bursum bill, which resulted in the close involvement of the NMAIA
and Eastern Association on Indian Affairs in the land fight. Using the various voluntary
organizations that came to the Pueblos’ aide, interested individuals penned a number of
articles that published in prominent national newspapers and magazines. These articles
appeared in Outlook, New Republic, Nation, New York World, Christian Science Monitor,
New York Times, and the Santa Fe New Mexican, among others. 68 The Pueblo coalition
collected money for its campaign from the constituents of these organizations.
The Pueblo response to the Bursum bill and the help they received from outsiders
made the legislation a toxic issue in Congress, which recalled the bill on 21 November
1922. And while the repeal of the Bursum bill was a success for the APC, its leaders
needed to include their voice in any new measures Congress took next. At the behest of
Collier, the Pueblos began planning a delegation for a visit to Washington, D.C., via
Chicago, and New York City. The APC hoped that the delegation could publicize the
Pueblos’ land struggle to the wider public, and drum up lobbying and financial support
enroute. In mid-January 1923, Sotero Ortiz, who was elected APC chairman at the
meeting in Santo Domingo, came to Tesuque in his Cadillac to pick up traditional Pueblo
regalia to take on the tour. While he was there, Ortiz elected Vigil to travel with the
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delegation, pointing to Vigil’s long-term attendance at APC meetings as proof of his
suitability. Vigil put on his traditional Tesuque clothing, had a farewell dinner, and
departed with fourteen Pueblo “costumes”—the Tesuque Lincoln cane in hand—as the
youngest member of the Pueblo delegation. 69 The delegation met at Lamy, New Mexico,
and boarded a Pullman car for Chicago. 70
After a bumpy ride on the train, Abeita, Ortiz, Antonio Romero (Taos), and others
spoke in front of various organizations in Chicago, including the Chicago Indian Rights
Association, to encourage members to lobby Congress on the Pueblos’ behalf. They also
appealed for financial assistance to fund their trip and other general efforts. Next, part of
the delegation stopped in New York City, and on 15 January the New York Times
reported Romero’s feelings on the land situation: “We want the white squatters put off
our lands, and we ask that we have a voice in governing ourselves.” 71 A number of the
Pueblo delegation also danced outside the New York stock exchange. Collier remembers
that their performance sent two thousand bankers “wild.” He deemed the dances a grand
success because many of these bankers subsequently lobbied Congress in opposition to
the Bursum bill. 72
Vigil and the Pueblos used their dances to achieve political success. Collier
consciously aimed to use Pueblo performances to arouse “the feeling of the American
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people.” 73 Historian Philip Deloria has pointed out that the identities of “Indianness” and
“Americanness” are laden with connections. Both Anglo Americans and Native
Americans have co-opted Indian identities for political purposes since the birth of the
American republic. As the idea of “Indianness” was under threat during this period, many
Native American leaders “played Indian,” employing “antimodern primitivism to defend
native cultures against the negative stereotypes left over from colonial conquest.”74 As an
expert eagle dancer, Vigil saw no harm in performing Pueblo dances, saying “our dances
are not wicked like you people.” 75
The delegation spent a further week in New York City after returning from
Washington and spoke at a town-hall meeting attended by “many thousand people,”
according to Vigil. The audience was so numerous, they seemed “just like ants.” At this
meeting, Vigil finally worked up the courage to speak after a series of other men had
done so. He spent a few moments addressing the audience in his native Tewa language
before making a heartfelt plea in English concerning the conditions of Tesuque and
Pueblo life. During his twenty-minute speech, Vigil defended Pueblo land, religion, and
life. “I kind of light up,” Vigil remembered, and along with the other Pueblo speakers, he
made quite an impression on the audience. 76 After they had spoken, many people came
to shake hands with the delegation, Vigil was embraced by a Catholic archbishop, and
individuals from the audience contributed fourteen hundred dollars to the Pueblos’
cause. 77 After this experience, Vigil thought he “was big then, boy!” and went on to
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speak at every subsequent engagement with the APC delegation. Equally important was
that, despite his youth, his Pueblo peers encouraged Vigil to speak up at future APC
meetings. 78 Indeed public engagements such as this became increasingly common for
many of the Pueblo leaders, who used this experience as a blueprint for the future.
Speaking at events hosted by interested parties and dancing in front of crowds
ensured that the news media covered the Pueblos’ campaign, as historian Herman Viola
states. 79 It was in Congressional hearings in Washington, D.C., however, that the APC’s
success was realized. Between 15–25 January 1923, the Senate Subcommittee of the
Committee on Public Lands and Surveys listened to testimony from Abeita, Collier, and
Wilson. Together, they pointed out the inherent wrongs in the Bursum bill. Indeed Abeita
appealed to the committee by pointing out the Pueblos’ long history of facing outsiders:
“We were civilized and lived as such until you came in to disrupt and corrupt our method
of civilization.” 80 Having convinced the subcommittee that the Bursum bill was grossly
unfair, the delegation departed Washington. Its lawyer, Wilson, remained to negotiate a
substitute proposal. The eventual bill he agreed to—the Lenroot bill—was not authorized
by the APC, was sympathetic to the settlers’ interests, and contained no provision for
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compensation to the Pueblos for any lost lands. As the APC delegation returned to New
Mexico, Collier made his way back to Washington to fire Wilson as the Pueblos’
lawyer. 81
Defeating the Bursum bill and then the Lenroot bill was equally divisive for the
APC as it was transformative. Soon, “the whole matter of the lands and the rights of the
Pueblo Indians” became “sorely entangled in the cobweb of politics.” 82 When Wilson,
backed by the NMAIA, agreed to the Lenroot bill and was subsequently sacked, the
Pueblos non-Indian coalition fell apart. Collier and the APC felt betrayed by Wilson’s
actions in agreeing to a substitute proposal that could potentially ruin the Pueblos land
situation. Having worked on Pueblo land for a long period, Wilson had some sympathy
for the interests of the Hispanic settlers who, he believed, had purchased land from the
Pueblos in good faith before the Sandoval decision in 1913. 83 Thus, representing the
NMAIA and other interests including the Eastern Association, Wilson claimed the middle
ground, a position that was more favorable to the political community in Santa Fe than
Collier’s and the APC’s position.
Collier, on the other hand, told Wilson, “You, Mr. Wilson, were given complete
trust by the Indians and their friends who believed you would stand immutably for certain
gains and against certain surrenders.” 84 Wilson claimed that Collier’s position was
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“vicious and destructive” due to his “opposition to law and forms of law.” 85 Having
sacked Wilson, Collier wrote to him, “I hope there will be no controversy. . . . But
controversy is better than surrender.” 86
Partly in order to help defeat the Lenroot Bill, in the spring of 1923 Collier
formed a new New York-based organization, the American Indian Defense Association
(AIDA). Collier was installed as executive secretary of the new body, which aimed to
fundamentally reform federal Indian policy. 87 In her analysis of Pueblo religious
struggles in the 1920s, Tisa Wenger points out that the white coalition in many ways split
along lines that represented their views on Pueblo culture. While Collier and the GFWC
respected Pueblo culture and wanted to protect it as it was, the NMAIA and Eastern
Association ultimately believed that the Pueblos should assimilate into mainstream
America. 88 These assimilationist organizations certainly believed they represented the
interest of the Pueblos, but, as was the case in many aspects of his life, Collier had a
powerful need to control proceedings from the center. And only by running his own
organization could he achieve this.
Significantly, Collier’s policy of defending Pueblo land with little compromise
secured the official backing of the Pueblos when, on 25 August 1923, the APC held
another meeting at Santo Domingo. Despite protest from Wilson to support the Lenroot
substitute, the APC produced a statement articulating its express support of Collier, the
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AIDA, the GFWC, and any work these organizations may do on the Pueblos’ behalf in
defeating the Lenroot bill. 89 The APC also demanded that the federal government provide
compensation for lost lands—a provision absent from the Lenroot substitute.90
Significantly, the APC gave no mention of other organizations, including the NMAIA
and Eastern Association on Indian Affairs, that had previously helped defeat the Bursum
bill.
Five days after this APC meeting, the NMAIA hosted a meeting of its own in
Santa Fe to discuss the emergence of the AIDA, and the APC’s apparent shunning of
their support. Roberts Walker attended, representing the Eastern Association and
members of other smaller regional organizations were also present. Obviously unaware of
how the APC functioned, Walker protested against the APC meeting of the previous
week, suggesting that since there was no legislation to discuss, a meeting was
unnecessary. Walker also accused the APC of being unrepresentative of the inter-Pueblo
community. He did not understand “by what method” individual Pueblos sent delegates
to the meeting, and accused the APC’s vote of being “no more pueblo action, or Indian
action, than action by this informal meeting here would be action of the city of Santa
Fe.” 91
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The NMAIA’s opinion on the APC was further complicated by the position taken
by Laguna Pueblo at this time. Laguna was a more progressive Pueblo and its leadership
was very much influenced by Father Fridolin Schuster, a man who ultimately hoped to
assimilate his Native flock fully into American society. Thus, Laguna sent delegates to
APC meetings, but they did not have the authority to vote in an official capacity. When,
on 29 August, the Santa Fe New Mexico incorrectly reported that Laguna, Santo
Domingo, San Felipe, Cochiti, Santa Ana, and Sandia were not present at the APC
meeting on 25 August, the NMAIA saw this as further evidence of the APC’s
unrepresentative nature. 92 Ina Sizer Cassidy, a close friend of Collier and the Pueblos,
pointed out to the NMAIA, however, that this report was “absolutely wrong.” Cassidy
was present at the APC meeting and remembered that “a general vote was taken and
every pueblo were in favor [of being represented by the AIDA and GFWC] and voted on
it except Laguna, who was given instructions not to vote on anything.” 93 While this was
discussed at the NMAIA meeting, the only Indian present, Martin Herrera of Santo
Domingo, attempted to quell the suspicion surrounding the APC and Collier: “John
Collier is doing what the Indians want, and he is going to do it.” 94
Wilson eventually backed down from attacking the APC, conceding that “it isn’t
really a question of whether the Indians are for Mr. Collier’s proposition, but with us it is
the question of whether Mr. Collier’s proposition is actually one that can be actually
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accomplished.” 95 Perhaps the main motivation for the objections of Wilson was that he
and the NMAIA wanted to work alongside the Indian Office and local Hispanics. The
APC, on the other hand, was explicitly turning to a more extreme position at this time,
and threatened to disrupt the local political conditions in New Mexico. Wilson was
worried that Collier and the APC were determined not to compromise. He noted, “the
Indian Office is very much aroused and feels highly injured.” 96
Despite the protests of the NMAIA, the APC and AIDA formed a strong coalition
that, by not backing down and asserting Pueblo sovereignty, was able to negotiate a more
favorable outcome for the Pueblos. After a meeting on 17 January 1924, the APC chose
thirteen delegates to visit Washington once again, this time in conjunction with the
AIDA. According to Vigil, this time around “it didn’t take long” to settle the issue and
after two or three days in the capital, “everything was alright.” 97 In fact, this APC
delegation helped convince Congress to pass the Pueblo Lands Board Act, which
sanctioned the formation of a three-person body in Santa Fe to hear land claims and
establish Pueblo boundaries. Significantly, the legislation put the onus on Hispanic and
Anglo claimants to prove continuous possession of contested land, and also included the
“principle of compensation” for the Pueblos. 98 All non-Indian settlers found to be on
Pueblo lands unlawfully were to be evicted by the Indian Office. The Pueblos Lands
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Board Act was landmark legislation for the Pueblos and the APC. The Pueblos had
suffered from unofficial encroachment on their lands for many decades and had also
faced down Supreme Court decisions and Congressional legislation that would have
formally displaced the Pueblos from their homelands. And while the Pueblos would
never reclaim all lost lands, the PLB had the potential to draw a line under the
encroachment on their land and provide monetary support for lands lost.
According to Vigil, the APC “learned so many things” because of Collier’s input
in the land struggle, and “the All Pueblo Council start[ed] improving.” Non-Indian
encouragement to go to Washington, D. C., in a united front was a significant step in the
council’s evolution. 99 Indeed this moment was equally important for the delegation
members. These experiences laid the foundation for the governing of the APC and the
pursuit of pragmatic Pueblo governance in the twentieth century. A string of Pueblo
leaders gained formative experience defending Pueblo sovereignty and the APC made
only limited concessions regarding Pueblo land as its negotiations with the federal
government evolved. By standing united and with the help of outsiders who understood
Pueblo culture and the significance of land to the Pueblos, the APC negotiated the
Pueblos a favorable position for the twentieth century. The dynamics of the Pueblo
coalition also demonstrated that by choosing their friends carefully, employing outside
help could help protect tradition and sustain Pueblo sovereignty.
Negotiating the passage of the Pueblo Lands Board Act was not the only
significant challenge to the Pueblos or the APC during the early 1920s. In the midst of
the Lenroot substitute fiasco in February 1923, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles
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Burke—a hard-line assimilationist—denounced traditional Pueblo dances as “evil . . .
foolish . . . useless and harmful.” 100 Burke eventually attempted to ban the dances, as
“missionaries and government officials” expressed “renewed concerns about the moral
influence of Indian dances.” 101 The Indian Office thought the dances were inappropriate
and sexually oriented. In response, the APC accused the Indian Office of “religious
persecution.” “Our religion is more precious than even our lives.” 102 Importantly,
however, the attacks on Indian dances came from many corners. While the Indian Office
led the charge from non-Indians, backed by missionaries and Christian-based
organizations such as the Indian Rights Association of Philadelphia, so-called progressive
Pueblo Indians also began a series of attacks on Pueblo culture and political organization.
As the voice of more traditional authority, the APC became the focus of many internal
and external attacks on legitimate Pueblo governance. Thus, as well as becoming a debate
between competing and interested non-Indians on the relative need for assimilation of the
nation’s Indians, the Pueblo dance debate also became a dialogue that challenged the
APC’s very legitimacy as a representative body from inside and outside the Pueblo
community.
Factionalism within individual Pueblos was a fairly common and organic
phenomenon well before the twentieth century, as different clans and moieties clashed
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over the legitimate governance of internal affairs. This situation was exacerbated at the
end of the nineteenth century when the federal government sent Native Americans from
across the United States to federally administered, off-reservation, Indian boarding
schools. Some students returning to their homelands brought back different conceptions
of modernity and frequently favored a more progressive approach going forward. As
outside interests began questioning the morality of what they labeled pagan Pueblo
dances, progressive Pueblo Indians from many tribes voiced their concerns over more
traditional or conservative leaders and the power of caciques within Pueblo society. And
while progressive Indians were able to gain publicity by piggybacking on external
criticisms of Pueblo culture, the genuine intentions and sentiment of the progressives was
complicated by controversies caused by non-Indians.
In an attempt to reform many aspects of Pueblo life, progressive Indians
themselves took center stage during the dance controversy. John Dixon, from Cochiti
Pueblo, who was educated at Carlisle Indian School, in Pennsylvania, and worked as an
Indian Office–appointed judge, eventually became the chairman of a progressive Pueblo
Council. Holding a rather extreme position even within the progressives, Dixon believed:
“The old parties are still savages, barbarians, idolaters. There are only two ways to settle
our disputes, either we of the new parties become savages again, or . . . they [more
traditional Pueblo society] become at least a little civilized, as we of the new are trying to
be.” 103 Men such as Dixon were unhappy with multiple facets of Pueblo society, and due
to the scrutiny the Indian Office gave the Pueblos’ religious and political institutions at
this time, they were able to gain a strong foothold in inter-Pueblo politics.
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Despite the legitimate complaints of progressive Indians, the majority of whom
were not looking to destroy their culture, only adjust it, their cause was often complicated
by the interference of outsiders connected to the Indian Office or other assimilationist and
Christian organizations. The more traditional Pueblo leaders, including the majority of
Pueblo governors and caciques, and thus APC members, at this time also had to defend
their culture against outsiders. “The so-called progressive element in our pueblos,” stated
Jose Aguilar of San Ildefonso, “provides a wedge by which outsiders manage to become
parties in our internal disputes.” 104
On 12 April 1923, Antonio Abetia (Isleta), Sotero Ortiz, and José Alcario
Montoya (Cochiti) were among a few men hosting an APC meeting at Santiago Pena’s
house at Santo Domingo Pueblo. And in an incident that exemplifies the impact of nonIndians on the progressive cause, while the men attempted to draw up the APC response
to Burke’s dancing circular, Nina Otero-Warren rushed through the back door of the
house and burst into the meeting. In an attempt to discredit the APC’s remaining
coalition, Otero-Warren, a close associate of the Indian Rights Association and an Indian
Office inspector of Indian schools in New Mexico, accused the APC’s friends of being
propagandists. 105 While Collier and white friends to the APC were frequently present at
APC meetings, this was one of many meetings held during this time where the Pueblos
wanted to speak to one another without the interference of outsiders—especially as the
subject matter in this case was culturally specific. Montoya, who was instrumental to the
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APC during these early years, remembered that no non-Indian was invited to this meeting
and, further, when they asked Warren to leave, she refused. 106 Otero-Warren also visited
other Pueblos across New Mexico in an attempt to discredit Collier, the AIDA, and the
APC.
At this time, the Indian Office as well as Christian organizations presented the
APC and Collier as opponents to progress and as supporting outdated and irrelevant
cultural and religious practices, which were supported by the Pueblos’ traditional political
structures. One organization in particular, the eastern-based Indian Rights Association,
became closely involved with denouncing Pueblo dances, the peyote practice at some
Pueblos, and other cultural practices. According to Wenger, the Indian Rights
Association encouraged and publicized the progressives’ complaints. 107 IRA president
Herbert Welsh articulated his goal as simply “Indian progress towards a better day.” 108
Yet other associates of the organization, such as Clara True, were accused of deliberately
agitating the religious and political conditions on the ground in New Mexico. Even
Schuster, who supported much of the progressives’ cause, accused True and Warren of
“sniffing around” Acoma and Laguna. He was suspicious of their intentions. 109 Aguilar
thought that True reveled in creating trouble within Pueblos and, in an appeal to Collier,
labeled her a “meddlesome busybody.” Expressing his support for Pueblo autonomy,
while simultaneously requesting Collier’s help (he and the APC did not consider the two
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mutually exclusive), Aguilar asked for “the chance to run our own affairs in our own
way.” 110
In May 1924, True and Warren helped progressive Pueblo parties form the
Council of Progressive Pueblo Indians, composed of twenty-five men from the
progressive factions of Santa Clara, Cochiti, San Juan, and Santa Ana Pueblos. The
Progressive Council hoped to assert itself as an inter-Pueblo body recognizable to the
Indian Office, and aligned itself in direct opposition to the more traditionally composed
APC. The newly formed Progressive Council penned a statement highlighting their
grievances, which included being chastised for refusing to partake in community ditch
work and being held under the power of the conservative factions of their pueblos, and
caciques in particular. They articulated many of their arguments around the notion of
American religious freedom, and claimed that they should be free to practice Pueblo
religion to any extent they wished without the fear of punishment from Pueblo leaders. 111
In June 1924, the GFWC hosted a convention in California, which Wenger labels
“a showdown event between competing reformers in the dance controversy.” 112 True and
Warren organized the progressives, inviting seven members of the council to speak in
front of the clubwomen in an attempt to shift the sympathies of the women away from the
APC. Simultaneously, Atwood and Collier circulated APC resolutions and gained the
support of the Los Angeles Times to portray favorably their version of Pueblo life.
Members of the APC also appeared at the convention to defend their traditional lifeways.
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Employing the terminology of religious freedom, True and Warren essentialized the
debate, claiming that the progressives were fighting a Christian battle to defeat
paganism. 113 Ultimately, the event did not noticeably impact the result of this debate. The
convention does show, however, how outside interests and the influence of outsiders
were important elements in the Pueblos’ battles.
Responding to the multiple accusations of the progressive council back in New
Mexico, the APC quickly defended the traditional elements of Pueblo society and
governance. The APC released a statement to the Santa Fe New Mexican, primarily
defending the position of cacique within Pueblo government. They stated that while
caciques have the right to nominate Pueblo officials, such as the governor and thus APC
members, they do not do so to harm any person or faction. The APC then attacked the
progressive council, labeling the members a “few persons, a bunch of gruntled [sic]
fellows who refuse to do your share of the work in your own Pueblo.” Finally, the APC
accused the progressive council of attempting to split the unity of the Pueblos and the
strength of the APC during the crucial period of the PLB. 114
At a packed APC meeting in July 1924, multiple progressive Pueblos, including
Dixon, as well as Warren and True, were present and spoke at length about the recently
enacted PLB. The APC feared that dissension between and within the Pueblos would
weaken their ability to reclaim lost lands. Since progressive Pueblos tended to have a
more formally recognizable education, they could appeal to the PLB more effectively
than APC leaders. Thus while the conflict between progressive and traditional leadership

113

Ibid., 213–16.
“All Lies, Declare Governors of Pueblos, and Village Officials,” Santa Fe New
Mexican, 2 July 1924.

114

44
arose over cultural and religious matters, the question of land still loomed large over
Pueblo communities. Undoubtedly, the APC was composed primarily of more traditional
leaders from within Pueblo society. Yet, the APC did include progressive voices. Pablo
Abieta, for example, considered himself a progressive member of Isleta and served for a
long period as an Indian Office–appointed judge there. Yet he remained a key leader of
the APC for many years and was consistently nominated by his peers into high-profile
positions of leadership.
At the meeting, APC chairman Ortiz called for calm and unity: “The only way we
can defend our rights is that we shall be united as brethren.” 115 And while Dixon
expressed his willingness to work with the APC on the question of Pueblo lands, True
and Warren spent much of the meeting questioning whether the assembly was even
representative of the Pueblos across New Mexico. 116 They pointed to the presence of
delegates from Zuni and accused them of not representing that Pueblo’s community due
to a conflict in governance there. True and Warren also considered it inappropriate that a
Pueblo barely affected by the land situation would have delegates present at the
meeting. 117
As evidenced here, the APC was far from immune to external and internal
questions over how representative it was of all Pueblos, despite its success in protecting
Pueblo homelands. In disagreements over the role of religion in Pueblo culture, the APC
did not ignore the progressives. The meeting from July 1924 shows the APC considered
the concept of Pueblo unity as the number-one priority, and this included the progressive
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factions of Pueblo society. And while the APC surely did not respect some progressive
individuals as much as traditional ones, its leaders recognized the importance of
presenting a united front to the outside world on the question of land.
Equally important, the Indian Office began to stand with the progressives and in
opposition to the APC. While factionalism within Pueblos continued to be a legitimate
issue within many Pueblo communities, the significance of the progressive council soon
declined. The question of assimilation, however, led the Indian Office to challenge the
authority of the APC. In 1926, the Indian Office created another body to rival the All
Pueblo Council: the United States Pueblo Indian Council. Earlier in that same year the
former chairman of the NMAIA, Margaret McKittrick, proposed to Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Charles Burke that a new body might help open a dialogue between the
Indian Office and Pueblo governors and officials. McKittrick still held grievances over
the split of the coalition and felt that such a council would help dissolve Collier’s
influence in Pueblo politics. 118 She suggested that the Indian Office mould the new
council in the same form as the recently established Navajo Tribal Council, which former
New Mexico territorial governor Herbert J. Hagerman helped set up. Commissioner
Burke requested that Hagerman preside over the council. Apparently he saw no conflict
of interest in Hagerman heading this council, while also being the chair of the PLB.
Burke stated that each Pueblo would send two delegates to meetings, and, where
factionalism existed, opposing parties would both be represented.
The APC, however, already represented the Pueblos through a very similar
format. The key difference was that the APC was independent of outside control. At an
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APC meeting on 6 October 1926, Collier addressed the council and articulated his
opinion: that the new council was a direct attempt to subvert the APC and its historic
independence. The APC responded at this meeting by reasserting their legitimacy to
negotiate without federal approval. Headed by Abeita, a committee drew up a short set of
written by-laws explaining how the council functioned. “The purpose of this
organization,” stated the committee, “is to promote the welfare of the Pueblo Indians and
their good relations with their white neighbors and to enable them to stand united.” 119
The by-laws agreed that every Pueblo is eligible to vote at the APC, and could send as
many delegates as they wished to each APC meeting. Significantly, each Pueblo was
allowed only one vote, confirming the APC as equally representative of all Pueblos. The
APC hoped that these by-laws—in many ways its first constitution—would force the
Indian Office to concede that the APC was a sovereign, functioning, and representative
inter-Pueblo government.
The APC could not stop the first meeting of the Indian Office council on 15
November 1926. At this meeting, Hagerman presided over matters, setting the agenda
and controlling its direction. Many members of the APC attended, including Abeita and
Joe Luhan of Taos. Hagerman explicitly told the attending delegates, many of whom
were suspicious of his intentions, that the Indian Office would not recognize any Pueblo
meeting as official unless representatives of the U.S. government were present. 120 He
named the new organization the United States Pueblo Indian Council. And while he
stated directly that this new Indian Office–run council would not necessitate the end of
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the APC, the traditional delegates still considered the meeting a blatant attempt to
convince the Pueblo governors to abandon their traditional council.
Abeita protested: “We come here like blind men and do not know what was going
to be done. I would ask the chairman what the real object of this meeting is.” 121
Hagerman responded that many Pueblo-related issues needed resolving, not least the link
between the government and the Indians. Francis Wilson was also present. Seemingly
dismissing the role of the APC, he told the delegates, “In past years we had no such thing
as this and we had to guess at what the pueblos wanted.” 122 Showing a lack of
understanding of the process of Indian and Pueblo government, Hagerman asked the
delegates to decide on an array of issues while in the meeting. Abeita responded: “If it
was only me they could finish the business in fifteen minutes. But I have to consider
1000 people at home.” Similarly, Lujan said, “We cannot decide this matter until we have
talked it over with our council.” 123
Quite prophetically, during the meeting a strong gust of wind displaced the
chimney on the roof of the building, sending debris onto three of the delegates below.
Abeita was hurt by falling vigas. 124 Antonio Lujan later remembered that this event
“scared us out” of the meeting and, perhaps, added to the Pueblos’ reluctance to return to
the United States Pueblo Indian Council. Similarly, the delegates realized that when
Hagerman appointed Frank Paisano of Laguna as the future chairman of the council
without any discussion, “we were on the wrong road.” 125 At an APC meeting a couple of

121

Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 21.
123
Ibid., p. 31.
124
Ibid., p. 21.
125
All Pueblo Council meeting minutes, September 1929, p. 11, reel 8, microfilm, Collier
122

48
weeks after the first Hagerman-run council meeting, the APC denounced Hagerman’s
body as a trap and, with the exception of Abeita, vowed to boycott further meetings. 126
The APC members reiterated that they were representative of the Pueblo community by
individually announcing how they came to be at APC meetings. All delegates declared
that they were sent by their respective tribal councils. Chairman Ortiz stated that the APC
was not fighting against the government but was simply “fighting for our rights and we
want to retain our ancient customs and form of government in our Pueblos.” Similarly the
APC expressed their thanks to those non-Indians whom they considered their real friends,
who did not do “just what they wanted; they have done what we wanted, what we told
them to do.” 127 The APC unanimously voted that all negotiations between the Pueblos
and the Indian Office should be through the APC. And in April 1929, the APC drafted a
letter sent to the Indian Office expressing “the honest hope that you may meet with us in
council. We will be glad to call a meeting of the council at any time that you may desire,
to discuss any matters with the pueblos as a group.” 128
The APC did not wish to cut ties with the Indian Office; they merely wanted to
meet at a forum controlled by all the Pueblos. And while the U.S. Pueblo Indian Council
met again in November 1927, delegates from only eight Pueblos attended. The majority
of those attendees were not associated with the APC. An APC member later declared that
the United States Pueblo Indian Council appeared to be operating in an underhanded
manner, and felt there was no need to attend. He stated, “Our own council meetings are
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powerful enough to carry on transactions with Washington.” 129 Indeed at a meeting in
September 1929, the newly appointed Indian commissioner, Charles Rhoades, attended
an APC meeting, where he witnessed delegates denouncing the U.S. Council and voting
to recognize the APC as the “official body through which business of the Pueblos should
be transacted with the government.” 130
With little support from the Pueblos or the Indian Office, the United States Pueblo
Indian Council soon faded into obscurity. Once again, the APC was able to resist being
overtaken by an outside organization. Further, through the efforts of traditional leaders to
defend the APC as the representative confederate council of New Mexico’s nineteen
Pueblos, the APC soon became the first point of contact for the Indian Office. The
persistence of the APC—even while defending tradition—protected the Pueblos from the
disintegration of their political and cultural structures.
The Bursum-bill fight and the eventual passing of the Pueblo Lands Board Act
were a major success for the APC in protecting the Pueblos’ way of life. In the process of
defending their homelands, the APC had made a staunch ally in Collier. Their experience
with him and other non-Indian organizations taught Pueblo governors the value of outside
organizations when they were co-opted carefully. Ultimately, the APC grew as a body, all
the while achieving success in securing their land base and ending decades of land-based
consternation. And while the APC and its members had to defend their role in Pueblo life
and politics—sometimes in the face of a barrage of criticism—the experience of
defending Pueblo tradition through the APC allowed the council to secure respect as an
inter-Pueblo organization. The result was that by the end of the 1920s, the APC had
129
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become a cooperative body, not an insular one. Further, the APC had also become a
responsive organization that was capable of negotiating the difficulties of twentiethcentury America. Certainly the Pueblos’ difficulties in the twentieth century did not end
when Congress passed the PLB—far from it. But the APC entered the 1930s as a robust,
outward-facing organization, competent at negotiating at the state and federal level.
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CHAPTER TWO
The All Pueblo Council in the Pueblo Lands Board Era: Water, Jurisdiction, and the
Indian Reorganization Act, 1928–1940

The ownership and use of land and water in many ways defined day-to-day life
for New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. When the APC
convinced Congress to pass the Pueblo Lands Board Act, this law was far from the end of
the story and there was no time for the Pueblos to celebrate their success. At the end of
the 1920s, the deteriorating ecological condition of New Mexico’s rivers, particularly the
state’s main artery, the Rio Grande, led to a sharp decline in the agricultural use of the
state’s water. In 1928, the newly established Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
(MRGCD)—which aimed to help the Anglo, Hispanic, and Indian residents of the state’s
valleys—began working on the lands of six Pueblos in an effort to regulate water use and
control flooding on the historic river. Similarly, in 1935, after he had merged the
Pueblos’ Indian offices into the United Pueblos Agency (UPA), Commissioner of Indian
Affairs John Collier instituted a period of close cooperation between the Office of Indian
Affairs and the Office of Agriculture. Led by Dr. Sophie Aberle, the UPA began to
expand its role in maintaining Pueblo land and water use and presided over Pueblo Lands
Board (PLB) settlements.
Due to the activism surrounding the Pueblo Lands Board Act, the APC was at this
time particularly alert to the threats facing the Pueblos. When these outside bodies,
concerned primarily with Pueblo water issues, began interacting with the Pueblos and the
APC, they reshaped the day-to-day realities of Pueblo life up and down New Mexico’s
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rivers. The sheer number of new bodies had the potential to overwhelm the sovereignty
of the Pueblos to govern their water-based issues, for land and water management
became a jurisdictional nightmare. As the single Pueblo organization that faced outwards,
the APC had to grapple quickly with these new bodies in order to maintain control over
Pueblo affairs and protect the Pueblos’ access to their river-based lifeblood. The APC
gradually became the middle-man for the negotiations between Pueblos and those
organizations imposing new rules on water in New Mexico. Only by the APC confronting
these organizations and inserting a Pueblo voice into the equation, did the Pueblos
maintain some authority over their own water rights.
Arising in the midst of these local questions over Pueblo land and water in New
Mexico was an issue of national importance for Indian Country. In 1933, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt installed Collier to the position of Commissioner of Indian
Affairs. Collier proposed returning a strong degree of self-government to tribes and
ending the Dawes allotment act. Collier’s landmark legislation, the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA), marked a crucial philosophical turning point in Indian-white relations across
the country. It essentially promised to end the destructive period of cultural assimilation
and land displacement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The legislation
allowed each tribe to draw up a constitution or charter, which, in theory, would return
self-government to tribes.
Collier introduced the IRA to the APC at a meeting at Santo Domingo in March
1934. The Pueblo leaders deemed the legislation more than palatable but, ultimately, only
one Pueblo adopted an IRA constitution by the end of the decade. The IRA offered little
to the Pueblos’ already strong political institutions. The day-to-day realities for the APC
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during the PLB era revolved around protecting and improving their water sources,
developing new irrigable land, negotiating with the UPA in practical matters, and
ensuring that Pueblo Land Board settlements were fair. Put simply, adopting IRA
constitutions was less important to Pueblo councils across New Mexico than mastering
their negotiations with the UPA, MRGCD, and other irrigation and agricultural programs.
Despite the APC’s support for Collier’s Indian self-government reforms (in principle), in
reality the confederate council had little reason, and too many distractions, to pressure
their home Pueblos to adopt IRA constitutions or charters.
This chapter aims to explain the Pueblo experience of the PLB era, 1928–1940,
by exploring how the APC dealt with the emergence of the MRGCD, the UPA, and
subsidiary bodies concerned with land and water-based improvements. By examining the
Pueblos’ experience through the APC during this time, I hope to show that regional
conditions defined the late 1920s and 1930s for New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos.
Similarly I hope to explain that regional water-related concerns marginalized the
significance of the IRA for the Pueblos. While this policy dominated national Indian
policy in the 1930s, and was proved a watershed in Indian history, land and water truly
determined Pueblo futures during the PLB era.
In 1933, Collier claimed the “pueblos of New Mexico have more control over
their own affairs than any other Indians.” 131 In a national context, the period leading up to
Collier’s selection as commissioner of Indian affairs was already a marked change from
the explicit assimilation policies of the early twentieth century. The actions of reformers
like Collier and Atwood was complemented by sympathetic groups, such as the Indian
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Rights Association. Even though these organizations often tried to involve themselves in
the internal dynamics of Pueblo affairs—much to the chagrin of the APC—their interest
in Indians nonetheless influenced Indian policy. In 1926, in response to this political
pressure, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work called for a “comprehensive survey of
Indian affairs.” Published in 1928, the report found “deplorable conditions in health,
education, and economic welfare,” which reformers like Collier used “as a whip with
which to chastise the government for its mismanagement of Indian affairs.” Prucha notes
that the Hoover administration (1929–1933), was transitional for Indian policy. Under the
direction of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Rhoades, the Indian Office “pointed
the way to a new future.” And while the Hoover administration “failed to revolutionize
Indian affairs,” there was nonetheless a growing federal recognition that the condition of
the nation’s wards was unacceptable.132
Illustrative of the declining condition for Indians nationwide was the agricultural
situation faced by the Pueblos in New Mexico. One of the aims of the Pueblo Lands
Board Act was to award the tribes compensation, which they could use to increase tribal
landholdings. And in 1924, the PLB took its first action by awarding Tesuque Pueblo
$29,000. PLB deliberations continued for a decade, and while the APC was more-or-less
satisfied with the general principles of the Pueblo Lands Board Act—especially as the
PLB began distributing significant monetary compensation to many Pueblos—Pueblo
leaders remained vigilant against potential new threats to their agriculturally based
world. 133 As historian James Vlasich has pointed out, “agriculture has defined the
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Pueblos throughout their history.” During the Spanish and then Anglo colonization of the
Southwest, “non-Indian minds” applauded the “industry, stability, prosperity, legality,
and technology” associated with the Puebos’ sedentary agricultural lifestyle. 134
Colonizers associated the Pueblos’ very agricultural foundation with civilization, and this
perception helped shield the Pueblos from the most-destructive elements of the removal
and reservation policies of the nineteenth century.
By 1920, the Pueblos’ cultural practices and political institutions were perhaps
more intact than those of tribes elsewhere in Indian Country, especially when compared
to those of the Plains tribes. The Pueblos’ ability to prosper was still threatened, however,
because of their reliance on river water for agriculture. In 1920, the middle Rio Grande
valley was in a “woeful state.” After “Centuries of irrigation from numerous primitive
ditches,” the Rio Grande water table stood at over 90 percent of the valley floor,
alkalizing the soil and destroying the nutrients capable of fueling food growth. Ironically,
in a place where water was in short supply, the valley was often waterlogged and had
turned to marshland. Consequently, between 1850 and 1920, while the population of
Anglo and Hispanic residents legitimately or illegitimately using Rio Grande waters
increased, the total agricultural acreage from White Rock Canyon in the north to Elephant
Butte reservoir in the south declined by over two thirds. 135
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In 1923, concluding that the Rio Grande required drainage and flood control if it
were to continue to support its inhabitants, the state of New Mexico enacted a
Conservancy Bill. And while this decision was made primarily for the benefit of nonIndian agriculturalists based in Albuquerque, the Pueblos’ land, too, was in need of
attention. In 1928, the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos—Cochiti, Santo Domingo, San
Felipe, Santa Ana, Sandia, and Isleta—were cultivating a little over eight thousand acres
of land. Significantly, there was “no cultivatable land lying idle” for these Pueblos; their
agricultural production had hit a glass ceiling while their population was slowly
increasing. Further, the cultivatable land available for these six Pueblos was considered
“insufficient for these Indians to make even a reasonable living on.” 136 Martin Vigil, for
example, remembered that during his Tesuque childhood in the 1910s, he planted small
patches of wheat corn and exchanged the produce for clothing in towns like Santa Fe. 137
Thus, farming was not a large-scale and profitable enterprise for Tesuque Indians or any
Pueblos of the middle Rio Grande. Instead, agriculture provided a means of subsistence
and self-sufficiency for New Mexico’s Pueblos, and in many ways it was also the basis of
their culture.
In order to bring the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos under the conservancy plan,
the MRGCD, on behalf of the state, had to negotiate a contract with the Interior
Department for the valley’s Indian inhabitants. Essentially at stake was the price the
Pueblos would have to pay for the MRGCD work undertaken on Pueblo land. The
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MRGCD proposed work that would include “flood protection, drainage, storage of water
with a proper distribution system, and river control.” 138 At an APC meeting in March
1928, all Pueblos but San Juan rejected the idea of the MRGCD. 139 After conservancy
surveys took place, however, and the Indian Office looked into the matter, the MRGCD
concluded that they could add a further 15,000 acres, or newly reclaimed lands, to the six
Pueblos’ land as well as improving the 8,000 acres they already cultivated. Significantly,
all other groups that fell under the MRGCD plan were in favor of the District’s plans.
Without Pueblo support, the project could not move forward.
The APC became the indicator of Pueblo support for the project. In APC meetings
on 17 September and 2 December 1927, the council invited MRGCD engineers to discuss
the provisions and decided it would endorse the MRGCD as long as it included
“protective measures” for the Pueblos and did not threaten “the destruction of any Pueblo
village now or in the future.” 140 And at an APC meeting on 19 January 1928, the council
came out as strongly in favor of the bill. The council drafted a resolution that stated their
support “for the protection of Indian land and rights” but maintained they were against
“any reimbursable debt . . . even as to newly reclaimed lands.” The APC-endorsed
version of the bill passed through the U.S. Senate only to be changed significantly in the
House. 141 While the original bill proposed that the Pueblos be charged only for work
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undertaken on the fifteen thousand “newly reclaimed lands,” the House version
essentially added an extra half a million dollars of debt to the Pueblos, because it would
also charge them for the eight thousand acres they already cultivated.
The irony of charging the Pueblos for their own land was sharply articulated by
Dr. W. J. Spillman of the Indian Office’s agricultural department at the hearings in 1928:
the Indians were out in the Rio Grande valley before the white man ever came there
and have every moral right to it. The white man came along and took the water
away from them and now they go to work to develop the water which the Indians
originally had and charge them for the water rights. 142
After passing through the House, the revised bill returned to the Senate, where a
Committee on Indian Affairs, chaired by sympathetic Sen. Lynn J. Frazier of North
Dakota, looked over the changes. Collier attended the Senate hearings to represent the
Pueblo position and all Rio Grande Pueblos—not only the middle six included directly
in the MRGCD—authorized him to speak on their behalf. 143 The whole Pueblo
community was invested in the outcome of the MRGCD, which threatened to rob the
Pueblos of their collective right to govern their own water rights. Long-time APC
chairman Sotero Ortiz sent a telegram to the Senate hearings in a last ditch plea to stop
the bill: “We Pueblos will be ruined if debt of one and one-half millions [sic] placed
on our lands . . . We kindly ask that . . . [the] conservancy bill be recalled and
considered. This is desire all Pueblos [sic], which is the truth.” 144 Collier made a
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robust defense of the Pueblo position and insisted that the Senate should amend the
legislation back to its original form. He also pointed out that these changes meant the
Pueblos would be saddled with debt at a higher rate per acre than those non-Indian
parties benefiting from MRGCD work. 145 Despite the Pueblos’ opposition to the new
version of the bill and the obvious objections of the committee chair Frazier, who
voted against the measure, the committee voted in favor of the MRGCD, seven votes
to four.
The outcome of the legislation was not particularly favorable to the Pueblos and
the APC was unable to negotiate for the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos an ideal position
within the MRGCD, even with substantial outside help. 146 However, the APC did
support the project in principle, and that position may have harmed the council’s ability
to achieve the exact terms they preferred. Further, in the long term the MRGCD did not
work closely with the APC; more often than not, the Indian Office remained a more
crucial partner to the Pueblos.
By 1931, the MRGCD had begun work on diversion dams in Cochiti and Isleta.
Similarly, the PLB continued to sort through individual land claims adjoining Pueblo
land. On a national level the issues of Indian land and water had become crucial
conversations in Indian Affairs after the publication of the Meriam Report. In response to
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the political pressure the report created, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, still
chaired by Senator Frazier, was authorized to investigate and inquire into “the condition
of the Indians throughout the United States” in 1931. 147 Significantly for the APC, on 6
May 1931, the committee traveled to Santo Domingo Pueblo, where the APC hosted the
touring senators. Pablo Abeita welcomed the committee: “We hereby turn the All-Pueblo
Council over to you so that you may go ahead and proceed with anything pertaining to
the welfare of us Pueblo Indians.” 148 The majority of Pueblo comments, delivered almost
exclusively by the members of the APC, was directed toward land and water issues.
APC delegates critiqued the ongoing work of the PLB and the MRGCD. At a
meeting a few days before the congressmen arrived at Santo Domingo, the APC had
organized a campaign to increase Pueblo compensation from the PLB. The council
formed an ad-hoc committee, composed of Pablo Abeita, Antonio Mirabal (Taos), and
Sotero Ortiz to argue—for individual Pueblos and all Pueblos collectively—for an
increase in the PLB compensation from Congress. At the hearings, Sotero Ortiz
remarked, “We are not satisfied with the [Pueblo Lands Board] Act. . . . We have not
been compensated the value of our lost land.” 149 In 1933 the Pueblos’ pressure paid off.
Collier’s first legislative success as Indian commissioner was the passage of the Pueblo
Relief Bill. This legislation built on the Pueblo Lands Board Act by increasing the total
Pueblo compensation from $621,000 to over $1.3 million. The Pueblo Relief Act

147

U.S. Senate, Survey of the Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings,
1931.
148
U.S. Senate, Survey of the Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings, 6
May 1931, Santo Domingo, New Mexico, 1928, p. 9935.
149
Ibid., p. 9936.

61
demonstrates the success of the APC’s collective cry for an increase in compensation at
Santo Domingo. 150
Beyond PLB issues, the MRGCD took center stage. Porfirio Montoya from Santa
Ana, for instance, told the congressmen that too many roads, railroads, and now canals
were being constructed on their land. And Santa Ana already had less land per capita than
any other Pueblo in the MRGCD. 151 Prompted by the intended plans of the MRGCD to
carve up yet more land with a fresh canal, Montoya demanded that Congress pass
legislation so that “anything that is built through Indian land . . . will be built so that it
will be satisfactory to the Indians and . . . not put any more expense on the Indians in lost
crops or labor.” 152 Explaining the situation at Isleta, Pablo Abeita stated that much of the
newly reclaimed land is “hard soil. . . . A lot of it is in bosk and a lot of it is in sand hills
and high places.” 153 He requested that the government level the land so that it would be
fit for cultivation. APC members made dozens of other specific requests to the
committee.
The demands and concerns of the Pueblo leaders on issues of land highlights the
greater significance of the event to the APC. Hosting a senatorial committee at Santo
Domingo served notice of the growing influence of the confederate council. The traveling
senators also visited Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Taos in New Mexico to discuss similar
problems with other tribes. At Santo Domingo, however, the traditional home of the
APC, the senators gauged the mood of the APC. The meeting in Santo Domingo and the
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input of the Pueblo leaders on their home ground signifies the important role the APC
played at this time in helping to resolve Pueblo land and water issues.
MRGCD-related practical considerations remained tantamount to Pueblo
priorities and APC meetings became the forum for the Pueblos to attempt to resolve these
issues. At a two-day APC meeting in early July 1933, for instance, Diego Abeita
illustrated the problems individual Pueblos faced in their dealings with MRGCD work.
Abeita explained that the MRGCD was “aloof” from the Pueblos and “unwilling to
understand our methods [for conservancy].” He went on to give an example in which the
district “put in an intake on the worst ditch. Isleta informed the engineers that it would
silt over in a year unless they eliminated a certain elbow on their drainage canal.” While
the MRGCD undoubtedly had excellent engineering knowledge, they would not work
closely or collaboratively with Isleta men who had worked on the ditches for generations.
“We have tried to coordinate with them,” Abeita maintained, but “they refuse that.” 154
Elsewhere, San Felipe complained that the MRGCD employees felled trees on Pueblo
land but refused to pay for them, despite their contractual obligation to do so. And at
Santo Domingo, the MRGCD allegedly took gravel without Pueblo consent, while
employing “Mexican” men for work on Pueblo property. 155 The MRGCD contract
required it employ only Pueblos on Pueblo projects. The APC was clearly unhappy with
MRGCD infractions on their sovereign soil.
While the APC continued to grow as a source of Pueblo voice, the Indian Office
necessarily remained crucial to the Pueblos’ achieving change. Before 1935, the nineteen
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Pueblos were under the jurisdiction of the Northern, Southern, and Zuni Pueblo agencies.
As Collier, who at this time was operating outside the Indian Office, recognized, “The
Indian Bureau Irrigation office stands, as it were, between the pueblos and the [Middle
Rio Grande Conservancy] District.” 156 Working alongside these agencies provided the
APC and its delegates a means to gain influence with important players in the Indian
Office. APC meetings were increasingly attended by Indian Office personnel, who
realized the necessity and utility of corresponding closely with the APC. For instance, at
the APC meeting in July 1933, H. C. Nueffer, a supervising engineer for the Indian
Office’s irrigation district, and Robert H. Rupkey, assistant engineer for the Southern
Pueblos Agency, joined Southern and Northern Pueblos Agency superintendents L. A.
Towers and Chester Faris to help deal with land and water issues for all Pueblos. Despite
their long-held suspicion of the Indian Office, APC leaders respected the work of Towers
and Faris. Various Pueblos voiced their approval of the agricultural work they were doing
on behalf of the Pueblos. Roland Duran of Picuris Pueblo stated that Faris had been
particularly attentive to the remote mountain Pueblo’s needs. 157 Towers and Faris, along
with the Indian Office engineers, played a crucial supervising role in helping the Pueblos
deal with the MRGCD. Despite the APC’s emergence as the space for the Pueblos to
negotiate with and exert their influence over outsiders on their own terms, the council’s
very limited resources meant that achieving change in practical matters still required the
work of the Indian Office.
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The political landscape of Indian Country was changing progressively as the APC
was busy negotiating with the MRGCD in New Mexico. By the end of the Hoover
administration, “All the elements were in place for a complete revitalization of the Indian
Bureau.” Only “a steady and determined person able to bring together a synthesis of ideas
and actions” was required to articulate the concerns of those individuals involved with
Indian affairs. 158 Roosevelt won the presidential election over Hoover in 1932, and
instituted a series of nationwide reforms, collectively known as the New Deal. Roosevelt
aimed to put Americans to work, expand and modernize the country’s infrastructure, and
pull the nation out of the Great Depression. Importantly for the Pueblos and Indian
Country, was his new appointment of Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs.
It is difficult to imagine that the APC as a council could have had more respect for
Collier, describing him in 1934 as “one of our best friends.” Diego Abeita (Isleta) nicely
summarized their mutual relationship: “I can truly say that Mr. Collier has had a great
part of his Indian education from the Pueblos. He has gathered the Indian knowledge; he
has had to work with largely from his [sic] observances of the Pueblos, and if the Pueblos
have been mistaken then Mr. Collier is mistaken also.” 159 By 1934, Pueblo leaders were
confident that any changes Commissioner Collier proposed would in no way threaten
their well-being. After all, Collier patently valued tribal structures. Since 1922, the hard
work of the council, and the allies they had made, particularly the now-powerful Collier,
allowed Pueblo leaders and communities to feel relatively secure about their future in
New Mexico.
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After shepherding successfully the Pueblo Relief Bill through Congress, Collier
spent “much of 1933 . . . connecting the existing programs of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs with the new agencies that the New Deal was then creating.” 160 For instance,
using funds from the Civilian Conservation Corps, a New Deal program, Collier
established an Emergency Conservation Work program, which provided Indians living on
reservations with local jobs during the depression. 161 Historians Vine Deloria Jr. and
Clifford M. Lytle have asserted that Collier began involving federal agencies in
reservation programs because “it would be much easier to secure landmark legislation [ie.
the IRA], since more of the federal establishment would have a stake in the outcome.” 162
As evidenced here, however, Collier’s early work as commissioner involved more than
merely the IRA. And the Pueblos were entangled in every aspect of these broad reforms.
In New Mexico, Pablo Abeita worried that after Collier’s appointment, the
Pueblos would now have to argue with their old friend, rather than embrace his
assistance. 163 And while Collier continued to work closely with the APC as Indian
commissioner, some of his decisions were inevitably not well received by the Pueblos.
One of his first steps was to merge many Indian Office jurisdictions into larger units in
order to create more powerful institutions. He intended to give his local superintendents
greater executive power over their jurisdictions, so that the Indian Office would be more
responsive to local needs. Previously, local superintendents tended to be in or nearby
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Indian communities. They lacked any executive power, however, and always had to
confer with Washington, D.C., for any real action to be taken. 164
For the Pueblos, this meant that the Northern, Southern, and Zuni Pueblo agencies
became the United Pueblos Agency led by Aberle, and headquartered in Albuquerque.
Collier expanded the manpower of the agency so that it would include men and women
working in specialized roles. As part of his wider national initiative, Collier also began a
period of close cooperation between the Indian and Agricultural Offices for work on
UPA lands, increasing the funds available to the Pueblos in the process. His ten years of
experience with the Pueblos had taught Collier that responsible land use and maintenance
was “fundamental to everything else if you are going to have a long future.” 165 He
instituted a nationwide cooperative program between the Indian Office and the Soil
Conservation Service (SCS) under the Office of Agriculture in an effort to give Indians
“a role in determining how conservation programs were to be operated on their
reservations.” 166 From 1935 onward the SCS began work on riverbank protection, ditch
cleaning, and dams across Pueblo country.
As was the case with the MRGCD, the SCS also caused a degree of jurisdictional
and practical confusion for the Pueblos. Martin Vigil, for example, brought to the APC a
difficulty Tesuque was suffering due to a misunderstanding between the Irrigation
Service and the Pueblo. 167 And in an effort to stop soil erosion between 1935 and 1936,
the SCS constructed an arroyo diversion at Sandia, a dam at Laguna, riverbank protection
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at Nambe, spreader dykes at Acoma, an arroyo at Laguna, and a diversion dam at Cochiti,
among other projects. Yet in almost every case, these projects failed with the first
significant rainstorm floods of the season. A UPA report suggested that “absolutely no
engineering or construction ability or knowledge were used in this work.” 168
These failings naturally brought Aberle under pressure from the APC early in her
tenure. She conceded, “We have had to get used to working with many different
people.” 169 The APC and the Pueblos were already disgruntled that they had lost their
good friends, superintendents Faris and Towers. Some members of the Taos delegation
felt that Aberle, as a woman, was an inappropriate choice for leading the UPA. Charlie
Kie, Martin Vigil, Pablo Abeita, and Diego Abeita, however, defended Aberle and
mentioned her good work in helping Santa Clara write its IRA constitution.
Despite the elaborate and overlapping work of the PLB, MRGCD, UPA, and SCS,
then, the Pueblos land and water situation remained insecure. In March 1936, the APC
sent a delegation to Washington, D.C., to testify in front of a congressional committee on
Indian Affairs regarding the land situation in New Mexico. Martin Vigil, Charlie Kie,
Antonio Abeita, and John Bird (Santo Domingo), while not entirely happy with the help
they had received from outside organizations, appealed for more land for the Pueblos and
further assistance with agriculture and grazing. Under Collier’s recommendation they
also appealed for continuing funding for the cooperative work of the SCS and Emergency
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Conservation Work. 170 The vocal leaders of the APC at this time, such as Vigil, Kie,
Diego Abeita, and Pablo Abieta, defended Aberle and the work of the UPA. While the
UPA was a centralized body representing all Pueblos, in many ways similar to the APC,
the APC delegates recognized that the council exerted little executive power. They thus
acknowledged the potential benefits of an organization wielding the power of the UPA
could bring the Pueblos. The APC was able to exert pressure on the UPA via Collier’s
relationship with Aberle. Indeed, Aberle claimed she was very well treated by the
Pueblos because Collier had hand-picked her as UPA superintendent. The Pueblo leaders’
close relationship with Collier meant that the UPA was particularly responsive to APC
concerns.
The UPA managed to achieve some success for the Pueblos in terms of land
management under Aberle. By the time she assumed control of the UPA, the Pueblos’
land base was already growing due to land purchases that were paid for by PLB
compensation. Indeed fifteen Pueblos (not including Acoma, Zuni, and Zia) eventually
added 47,054 acres to their land base with PLB money. 171 During this time, other
opportunities arose for the Pueblos to increase their land base because, under the terms of
the IRA, the secretary of the interior was authorized to acquire additional lands for
reservations. 172 At Acoma, for instance, the tribe took advantage of the land acquisition
program to purchase 27,247 acres within their reservation. A raft of other New Deal
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agencies or acts—including the Submarginal Lands Board, Federal Surplus Relief
Corporation, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and Bankhead-Jones Act—also
led to significant land gains that enlarged the size of the Pueblos’ land. 173 The UPA
supervised these proceedings.
Before the Pueblos had uncontested use of their newly acquired and old land,
however, Aberle “aggressively sought settlements to finish the work begun by the Pueblo
Lands Board in 1924, clearing claims against Indian land.” 174 After finally removing all
non-Indian settlers from Pueblo lands, as determined by the PLB, Aberle announced that
all PLB lands had been cleared in 1938. The work of the PLB, MRGCD, and New Deal
legislation resulted in the Pueblos securing approximately 667,500 acres of new land
between 1934 and 1944. They had increased their land base by 50 percent. 175 These land
gains were was not an unqualified success, however. For example, MRGCD work
increased the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos’ land by over thirteen thousand acres. Yet
many of the Pueblos had neither the technology nor the need to capitalize on this tripled
land acreage. 176 Similarly, because local non-Indians were reluctant to sell irrigated land
to Pueblos, only 2,869 of 47,054 total acres of land purchased by the Pueblos using PLB
funds were irrigated. In the arid valleys of New Mexico, land without irrigation was
virtually useless for agricultural purposes.
By 1935, the Pueblos had to contend and negotiate with multiple Indian Office
agents, and a myriad of conservancy and irrigation bodies, while corresponding closely
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with their attorneys to ensure that the work of the PLB was producing favorable
outcomes. This was undoubtedly a transformative period for the APC, who often found it
difficult to distinguish the MRGCD from the Indian Office irrigation division. Pueblo
communities often considered federal administration to be arbitrary and confusing. Yet
despite these struggles, the APC had become the forum for Pueblo negotiations with
outside organizations by the mid 1930s. As an example, an APC meeting in April 1936
was attended by representatives of eighteen Pueblos (Zuni was absent due to poor road
conditions); the commissioner of Indian affairs; the UPA superintendent; field
representatives and Irrigation Division officials from the Indian Office; and Pueblo
attorney William Brophy (who later succeeded Collier at the Indian Office). Certainly,
this cooperation reflects the changes Collier instituted within the Indian Office and across
Indian Country. Only ten years earlier, the Indian Office had attempted to undermine the
authority of the APC by creating a rival council. Yet in 1936, the APC was hosting the
most important men and women of the Indian Office, working closely with them to solve
Pueblo matters. This change demonstrates both the national shift in valuing tribal
political structures and the APC’s growing willingness to work with outsiders to increase
their regional power.
That the Pueblos could meet together and host outsiders was significant. The APC
began to realize that increasing the breadth of input from outsiders was helpful to their
day-to-day and long-term objectives. APC delegates also began to show increasing
sophistication with regard to the political process. Eli Beardsley of Laguna during this
time referred to the U.S. constitution to demonstrate that “in union there is power. If we
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stand together, united, we can [succeed].” 177 Still, the APC remained wary of excluding
older and more traditional leaders from its consultation with outsiders. The conservative
Santo Domingo Pueblo was invariably the host of APC meetings, and their entire council
often attended APC meetings. In 1933, Augustine Aguilar of Santo Domingo described
the difficulties he faced in helping his councilmen understand the wider concept of
working with outsiders:
I have been a member of the [All Pueblo] Council for fourteen years. I have
attended every meeting we have had with the Conservancy and your Engineers, and
everyone in the room knows me as a member of the Council, and I am representing
the pueblo here. I talk for my Council men here and interpret for them everything
you say, although it is a very hard job for me to make these old people understand
your ways. 178

While the APC was certainly transitioning into a more responsive body that hoped to
protect and adapt to the changing circumstances of the twentieth century, the council
remained wary of the need to maintain the traditional hierarchy of Pueblo society.
Considering the bevy of negotiations that the APC had to contend with at this
time, it is easy to forget that across Indian Country, Collier’s proposed IRA dominated
the 1930s. Owing to his close work with the Pueblos and other tribes across the country,
Collier’s legislation aimed to return to tribes a degree of self-government that was
previously unparalleled. Title I of the legislation allowed tribes to draw up constitutions
and charters that had the ability to protect them from outside interference by putting them
on a stable legal footing. Also available was more financial aid for tribes and the ability
to assume gradually responsibility from the Indian Office for certain functions. The
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legislation was intended to produce “the progressive transfer of municipal functions to
the organized tribe.” 179 The IRA also attempted to end the Dawes Allotment Act,
improve Indian education, and establish Indian courts.
On 15 March 1934, in the council hall of Santo Domingo Pueblo, the APC
discussed the relative merits of the proposed IRA and how it would affect the Pueblos.
Taos delegate Antonio Mirabal declared, “We are not going to fight against ourselves. . . .
We are in favor of this bill.” In the presence of Collier, Diego Abeita lauded the spirit of
the legislation: “The Bill embodies many policies that have been advocated and voiced
by the All-Pueblo Council for many years.” Chairman Ortiz urged the governors of the
Pueblos to take advantage of the bill, believing that “now is the time for us to take the
protection we have been asking for.” 180 After the meeting had concluded, each individual
Pueblo council gave the IRA due consideration, and all but Jemez approved of Collier’s
national plans to return a degree of self-government to tribal councils and end the
destructive results of the Dawes Allotment Act. Yet despite the apparent enthusiasm
these men expressed, by the end of the decade only Santa Clara Pueblo had taken
advantage of the IRA by acting on its central provision and adopting a constitution. Why
did almost all Pueblos choose not to adopt legislation that aimed to return selfgovernment to tribes while increasing land rights—two of the most pertinent issues for
the Pueblos?
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Historian Graham Taylor concludes that the IRA aimed “to promote forms of
community self-determination enabling Indians to function in a modern economic
environment within the framework of their own traditional cultural institutions.”181 For
the Pueblos, merging their traditional institutions into modern governmental formations
while protecting their historic sovereignty was not feasible. The APC felt that the general
principles of the IRA were acceptable and would help protect the sovereignty of the
Pueblos. As Orlando Durand of Picuris noted, however, “It is very simple to talk, but it is
pretty hard to fulfill. . . . We all desire to preserve our pueblo traditions and our pueblo
rights and to obey our officers.” 182 While supportive of the IRA in principle, he believed
the reform could potentially empower the governor instead of the caciques or war
captains who were charged with maintaining the continuity of Pueblo life. Sotero Ortiz, a
man particularly respectful of tradition himself, said that he tried to engage his tribal
council in a discussion on the IRA, but was told “nothing doing.” 183 Quite simply, many
of the more traditional Pueblo leaders neither understood, nor particularly cared to
understand, the provisions of the IRA. The APC itself was composed of predominantly
traditional leaders who had been elected governors or delegates to the APC by their
traditional councils. The work and cooperation of the APC with outsiders, though, meant
little to the more conservative tribal councilmen who were concerned that the IRA was an
unnecessary intrusion on their political institutions. Despite his support of the IRA, even
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the fairly progressive Pablo Abeita stated, “I hope that I will be seven feet under the
ground when my people start voting.” 184
Collier realized the quandary the Pueblos were in. “How can we draw up
constitutions,” he asked, “which can be adopted by a Pueblo without in any way
shattering the traditional system?” 185 After discussion with the APC and despite their
enthusiasm, at least superficially, the IRA’s chief architect conceded that if the Pueblos
could not form a way to adopt constitutions without disturbing “the old institutions, then
you oughtn’t to have it.” 186 Indeed the only Pueblo to adopt an IRA constitution in the
1930s was Santa Clara, which had been deeply divided for many decades by internal
disputes between four rival factions. 187 For Santa Clara, the IRA offered an opportunity
to construct a stable political structure. For the majority of the other Pueblos, however,
reforming or formalizing their stable self-government did not seem a particularly pressing
or necessary issue. Combined with the changing dynamics that day-to-day life in the late
1920s and early 1930s entailed, and despite their trust in Collier, it becomes easy to
understand why the Pueblos almost universally chose not to adopt IRA constitutions in
the 1930s. The Pueblos believed that the IRA had little potential to boost their
sovereignty, and thus they almost universally rejected IRA constitutions.
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Despite the constant struggle the Pueblos faced in the Pueblo Lands Board era to
maintain land and water rights, and thus preserve the basis of their culture, it was
nonetheless a transformative period for the APC. Historians have debated the merits and
long-term impact of Collier’s IRA reforms. What seems clear is that the political
momentum he created, due to his respect for Indian self-government, allowed the APC to
establish itself as an organized political confederate council. When Collier eventually left
office in 1945, the momentum of his reforms diminished, and soon, Indian Country faced
the potential for federal termination of their tribal status. Yet APC members gained a
significant political education as leaders between 1928 and 1940. Martin Vigil, for
example, went on to serve as APC chairman for ten years in the 1950s and protected the
Pueblos from termination’s most destructive elements. Similarly, Diego Abeita built on
his time with the council in the New Deal era by eventually representing the APC
Irrigation Committee in midcentury battles over water rights. Taylor states that during
this time period, with the help of Collier, the APC moved “beyond representing the
villages in a legal capacity in the courts and before Congress, as it had largely done in the
previous decade.” Instead, the APC began to “take a more assertive role in internal
matters affecting the pueblos generally,” for economic and administrative requirements
“created some pressure for greater centralization of control.” 188 The threats to Pueblo
sovereignty, too, forced the APC to tighten its control of Pueblo affairs.
For the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico and their confederate council, the PLB
era was dominated by negotiating with various state and federal institutions to defend and
advance Pueblo land and water rights while protecting political sovereignty. The added
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layers of bureaucracy from the MRGCD and Indian Office often caused confusion and
battles over jurisdiction. More importantly, the various organizations began to impinge
on the Pueblos’ control of their own water rights. The APC, however, became the front
line in maintaining a semblance of Pueblo control over water-rights negotiations. Further,
these issues allowed the APC to develop connections and political clout that would
eventually protect them. This development was particularly aided by the political
optimism that Collier’s time with the Pueblos had created. Local conditions often defined
life on reservations and in Pueblos. The modern complexities of the twentieth century
presented the Pueblos with fresh challenges that affected their everyday existence. By
organizing around the APC, the Pueblos found the means to grapple slowly with their
land and water situation in a rapidly evolving New Mexico.
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CHAPTER THREE
Midcentury Transitions: The All Pueblo Council in Post–World War II America,
1940–1962

In 1940, after leading the APC for almost two decades, Sotero Ortiz and Pablo
Abeita stepped down as respectively APC chairman and secretary to make way for
Joseph Tafoya of Santa Clara Pueblo and Abel Paisano of Laguna. Ortiz and Abeita had
been present before and during the Bursum-bill fight. Their absence from the APC
leadership represented a changing of the guards. Tafoya was chair for the next six years,
but the activism of his leadership was hampered by the national and regional conditions
caused by World War II. Before the end of the war, the landscape of Indian Country,
including New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos, changed dramatically. By the end of 1941, the
New Deal programs of the previous decade had been replaced by wartime policies and
resources were appropriately redirected away from Indian affairs. Early in 1945, before
the war had ended, Collier resigned from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) after a longstanding feud with Congress. 189 World War II also drained Pueblo society of leadership
during the war, as Pueblo men joined the U.S. military in droves. These men were of
leadership age and tasted non-Pueblo life during their military experience. On their
return, the industrial boom of the war continued across the United States and many
Pueblo men chose to divide their time between non-Indian and Pueblo life.
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Suffering from the loss of Collier’s influence and a lack of cooperation from a
resource-poor Indian Bureau, the APC went through a period of relative inactivity during
and immediately after World War II. As chairmen of the APC, Tafoya and then Paisano
struggled to sustain meaningful relationships with outside organizations. As federal
Indian policy shifted toward assimilation and then termination, the BIA ceased to support
tribal organizations as it had during Collier’s reign. The BIA was also low on manpower
and the political clout required to react to the needs of the Pueblo population.
Only in the early 1950s, motivated by the potential impact of federal termination
policies, did the APC once more sustain enthusiasm for a single pressing issue. The
chairman during this time, Martin Vigil, fought termination while beginning to
modernize the format and procedure of the APC, all the while corresponding closely with
the BIA and other organizations. Vigil increased the executive authority of the APC
chairman, limited APC input on religious matters, and formed more in-depth
relationships with outsiders. Thus, despite the midcentury representing a transition for the
APC and a lull in their activities, by the early 1960s, the Pueblos had avoided termination
and sat in a healthy position to push for a greater degree of self-determination.
When the APC elected Tafoya chairman of the APC in May 1940, Indian
Country’s enthusiasm for reform, originally sparked by Collier’s Indian New Deal, was
already waning. Only 35 percent of Native American tribes voted to accept Collier’s
vision of tribal government. Landless and politically weak Indians in California, the East,
Oklahoma, and the Great Plains gained little from the IRA’s economic incentives. 190
Many tribes were skeptical of the speed at which Collier implemented his vision of tribal
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government, while others—including the Pueblos—could not consolidate modern
governmental structures with traditional ones. 191 Further, the nation’s most populous
tribe, the Navajo Nation of New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah, fiercely resented the
devastating impact of another of Collier’s policies: the Livestock Reduction Program.
While the tribal reception of the Indian New Deal was only lukewarm, Collier was also
deeply unpopular in Congress between 1937 and 1945. Described by Prucha as “a man
besieged,” Collier was accused of being a communist and of working against the federal
long-term goal of assimilating Indians into the mainstream. 192 In 1937, Congress even
attempted to repeal the IRA.
After the Japanese bombing of Peal Harbor in December 1941, the entrance of the
United States into World War II immediately changed Congressional priorities. The BIA
became one of the biggest casualties in the wartime political economy, and this drasic
reduction forced Indian policymakers to take another step back from tribal entities.
During the war, the BIA received both an “absolute loss of dollars” from Congress, as
well as a disproportionate cut in funds “in comparison with other agencies.” In 1942, in
an example of the newly peripheral nature of the BIA, the government moved the bureau
from Washington, D.C., to Chicago. The following year the BIA’s funding was cut by 25
percent. 193
The landscape of Indian Country changed dramatically during the war years.
Alison R. Bernstein, a historian of the Indian experience during World War II, notes that
as America moved closer to entering the war in 1940, the BIA issued a memorandum that
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recommended “placing tribal resources at the government’s disposal.” 194 This move
essentially opened up Indian lands to the federal government for war purposes in the
realm of food production and mineral extraction. Similarly, the BIA made its hospitals
and education programs available for non-Indian uses. Historian Kenneth R. Philp has
also suggested that the Selective Service Act—which did not discriminate against Native
Americans—meant Indians were “no longer . . . classified as a separate group of
citizens.” 195 Outside military service, Indian life changed dramatically when a vast array
of jobs near reservations sprang up to support the needs of the war. Many Indians not
engaged in the military effort, and those willing to leave their homelands, began flocking
to cities such as Albuquerque to fill vacant positions in industry and production. 196 For
the majority of Indian workers, war-time jobs were their first experience of a wage-based
economy.
World War II also ushered in demographic shifts in Pueblo society. When Pueblo
men began returning from fighting in overseas theaters, they had to decide whether to
continue functioning within white society or to return to their homelands. Of the twelve
hundred Pueblo men who fought abroad, by the end of 1945 six hundred had returned to
their villages. And of these six hundred, the BIA reported that one-third planned to find
work in Albuquerque. 197
These changes meant that during the war, many Pueblo people who normally
would have participated in their Pueblo’s political process were instead exposed to the
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values of white society. Those who ventured away from home were able to earn regular
paychecks and taste the positive (and negative) aspects of mainstream society. Despite
the potentially devastating impact of the loss of leadership-aged men, Pueblo society
retained a core of its leaders and structures. And while precise figures of the demographic
impact of the war are unknown, the Pueblo population grew by 15 percent between 1940
and 1950. 198 In 1946, many Pueblos held a weeklong festival to honor the contributions
of their veterans in World War II. 199 This was not the case at Zuni Pueblo, however,
where returning veterans received a hostile reception from tribal elders. Because of their
experience in the white world, elders considered the returning men impure and infected
with the ills of white society. Consequently nearly seventy of the two hundred Zuni men
who fought in the war soon left their home Pueblo. 200
Despite the difficulties of returning to Pueblo life, however, many men who had
served in the military soon moved into leadership positions within Pueblo society. Well
before World War II, Pueblo men who had fought in American wars had returned to their
homelands to find leadership positions. APC chairman Tayofa, for example, fought in the
Great War, while Abel Paisano served in the campaigns against Pancho Villa in Northern
Mexico. World War II veterans such as Joe Sando (Jemez), Miguel Trujillo (Isleta), and
Popovi Da (San Ildefonso), among others, returned to work in leadership positions with
their respective Pueblos and the APC. Thus, while the APC certainly lacked men of
leadership age during and immediately after WWII, in the long term many of these men
reintegrated into Pueblo society and filled positions of leadership. As we shall see,
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however, these men’s worldviews were frequently challenged and changed by their
experience in white society.
Collier’s resignation as Indian commissioner was illustrative of the shifts in
Indian policy that occurred during and after the War. 201 For the APC, Collier’s
resignation meant that they lost a valuable friend and ally. Similarly, his resignation
represented the true end of the Indian New Deal and ushered in a new era of federal
skepticism toward the tribal nature of Indian communities. In part because of American
Indians’ contributions to the war effort, many lawmakers believed the nation’s original
inhabitants ought to be treated like all other (white) Americans. Despite the optimism
apparent in this opinion, the direction of Indian policy soon turned away from helping
tribes, and toward the integration of Indians into American society.
In the mid 1940s, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) Act,
which ultimately indicated the changing tide of Indian policy. In 1946 Congress
established the ICC to settle tribes’ long-standing land claims. Some supporters of the
bill—such as Collier, his successor William Brophy, and organizations supportive of
tribal sovereignty—saw the bill as the final act of the Indian New Deal and believed the
commission would force the government to live up to treaty obligations with its
indigenous wards. Yet the ICC also received support from those who hoped to see the
integration of Indians into wider society. These integrationists saw the ICC as a means to
an end. By settling tribal claims, integrationists believed that not only would tribal
members finally be free from their tribal structure, but the federal government’s
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responsibility to its indigenous wards would be fulfilled. 202 They felt that after receiving
compensation, Native individuals would be free to join the wider American society. The
direction of federal Indian policy, and the interpretation of the ICC, was crystallized in
1948, when President Harry Truman’s Hoover Commission on Executive Reorganization
recommended that federal policy support the full integration of Native Americans into
wider society. 203
The limited resources of the BIA in WWII and the subsequent drive toward
integrating Native Americans into wider society posed a number of challenges to the
APC and its leaders. Jemez historian Joe Sando, who joined the Navy during World War
II, remembered that the economic impact of the war caused a “dangerous shortage of
personnel upon whom the Indian people relied.”204 One tangible loss for the Pueblos due
to this decrease in available personnel was the reassignment of Aberle, the UPA director.
In 1944, Aberle, who had a doctorate in anatomy, was transferred to the National Medical
Research Center in Washington, D.C.
Due to the political and economic conditions caused by the war, the APC’s drive
for sovereignty faltered. In many ways the APC’s main priority during this time became
to ensure merely that the BIA’s limited funds continued to provide the Pueblo people
with enough resources for food and education. After Santa Clara adopted an IRA
constitution in 1935, the Pueblo elected Tayofa governor, and he soon began participating
in APC meetings. Within five years, the APC had elected him chairman. Tafoya had to
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lobby the BIA particularly hard during this period to avoid the impoverishment of Pueblo
communities. There was a shortage of teachers at Indian schools in New Mexico, and
Tafoya attempted to ensure that schools attended by Pueblo children were properly
funded. Tafoya also worked within Pueblo society and, backed by the APC, directed that
tribes should only allow Pueblo children to be withdrawn from school on special
occasions. Previously, parents withdrew their children in the springtime to participate in
sheep camps and fiestas. Similarly, the APC informed the local boarding schools that for
Pueblo fiestas, students should only be absent for their home fiesta, once per year. As a
graduate of Carlisle Indian School and as a member of the Winter moiety at Santa Clara,
which believed ceremonial practice should not be compulsory, Tayofa aimed to ensure
Pueblo children received a modern American education. 205
In October 1946, Abel Paisano of Laguna replaced Tafoya as APC chairman.
Paisano was educated at Albuquerque Indian School and spent a considerable period of
his life in the Duke city, working as a mechanic for the UPA. Some of the older Pueblo
leaders looked on Paisano with suspicion because of his connections with the BIA, and
the recent memory of Hagerman’s Indian Office run Pueblo council,. 206 Still, Paisano
spent his tenure as APC chairman attempting to reach across institutional divides. And
although he could not unite the Pueblos into determined action, Paisano did achieve some
success when he encouraged cooperation with outsiders. Due to his ties to the BIA, for
example, Paisano secured the use of the Albuquerque Indian School auditorium for APC
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meetings. 207 This was not necessarily a popular measure among APC delegates. Indeed in
1939, the APC had rejected the idea of moving away from their “time-honored capital” of
Santo Domingo. 208 And in 1943, Diego Abeita stated that “the Pueblos don’t feel free to
express themselves while they are guests of the Indian Bureau,” because “they must
always comply with the wishes of the Indian Bureau while they are on the Government
Indian school grounds, or Indian Bureau property.” 209 And while the APC operated
independently from BIA control at AIS, the forum undoubtedly posed problems for more
traditional delegates.
The council also weighed in on a range of other local issues. The APC had to deal
with BIA cuts to local schools in 1947. The next year Paisano accused the federal
government of discriminating against Indians in an attempt to overturn the continued ban
of liquor sales to Native Americans. 210 Paisano also hired James Stewart, the
superintendent for the Navajos, to represent them before the ICC. 211 Paisano’s chief
success as APC chairman, however, was in conjunction with the BIA, when he helped
secure the construction of the Bernalillo County-Indian Hospital in Albuquerque in 1952.
Drawing on his relationship with Commissioner William Brophy, Paisano was selected to
became a member of the hospital’s board of trustees in 1949. In June 1950, the APC
unanimously backed the construction of the hospital and wired President Truman to
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declare their support for the project. The APC helped convince the BIA to fund the
project to the tune of $1.5 million. The total cost was over $3 million. 212
Ultimately, Paisano’s tenure was constrained by the national context of the time
and Paisano was also conscious of the APC’s apparent lack of direction. He called an
APC meeting in February 1947, and invited multiple members of the BIA to attend in an
attempt to encourage greater participation between Pueblo governors and the BIA. “Lack
of clear statements of Indian wants” noted Paisano, “has hampered the [All Pueblo]
council.” 213 Under Tafoya, the APC had begun paying Felix Cohen, a prominent attorney
and architect of the Indian New Deal, to represent their interests in Washington, D.C, and
to advise them on the actions of the BIA. However, in 1950, Cohen complained to the
APC that they had not met frequently enough to stay abreast of events in the capitol. In
particular, Cohen believed that the APC should have frequently visited Washington, D.
C., to help him represent their interests. The APC paid Cohen $100 per month for his
services, yet he reported that between July 1949 and October 1950, the APC did not
meet, or, at least, report their meetings to him. 214
Perhaps the primary difficulty the APC faced at this time was the lack of a single
issue that necessitated a unified Pueblo response. Yet in 1948, the APC failed to act when
presented with an opportunity to advance the rights of the Pueblos. In 1947, the
President’s Committee on Civil Rights criticized the inability of Indians to vote in New
Mexico and Arizona. Given that they had fought in World War II, the report read, Indians
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were considered citizens, and that they were subject to an array of taxes (except for those
lands held in trust), Indians should have full representation. On 14 June of the following
year, Isleta-born Miguel Trujillo, a member of the APC who was educated at
Albuquerque Indian School and Haskell Institute in Kansas, deliberately challenged his
inability to vote. Having served as a Marine during World War II, Trujillo realized that
Indians faced inherent discrimination in American society and, in New Mexico, were also
disenfranchised. Thus he attempted to register to vote in Los Lunas, near Isleta Pueblo,
but was refused on the grounds that Indians were not taxed. Trujillo then approached the
APC in an attempt to convince them to back his cause. 215 According to Sando, however,
“there were still some old-timers on the council who were fearful of losing their lands
and their autonomy,” and thus the APC did not weigh in on Trujillo’s case. 216
Undeterred, Trujillo still attempted to vote in the elections, and was consequently
arrested. With the help of Cohen’s legal counsel, Trujillo sued the recorder of Valencia
County, claiming that Indians in New Mexico paid a variety of taxes. His case reached
the U.S. District Court of New Mexico. On 3 August 1948, in Trujillo vs. Garley, the
court declared unconstitutional the sections of the New Mexico constitution that denied
Indians the right to vote. Significantly, the verdict of the court was influenced by Trujillo
and the wider Indian community’s military service during the war. The verdict concluded
that the state’s Indian inhabitants were patriots, paid taxes, and thus deserved the right to
vote. 217
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Perhaps ironically, once the Pueblos had the right to vote, the APC unified
quickly around their newly won franchise. After an eight-hour session at a meeting in
Santo Domingo on 2 October, the APC issued a “strong plea for all eligible Indians to
register” to vote. The addition of seventy-five hundred Pueblo voters of eligible age had
the potential to impact significantly the direction of state elections. Indeed the Gallup
Independent noted that for the 1948 election, the entrance of the Pueblo vote had the
potential to decide the outcome of the state races. At this time, the APC refrained from
endorsing any specific candidates—so as not to impinge on individual Pueblos’
independence from one another—but vowed that all Pueblo governors would receive
APC-collected information on each candidate. 218 It is difficult to know exactly why the
APC failed initially to get behind this issue, or to unite around another issue during this
time. Certainly, WWII and its consequences, including the loss of Collier as Indian
commissioner, combined with an unhelpful and resource-poor BIA to constrain the APC.
Yet even when presented with the issue of Indian civil rights, the APC refrained from
taking an official position.
Further complicating the APC and its policies in the postwar years was the
formation of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). The NCAI is a “truly
Indian and truly national” Native American-run council, established in 1944, that in its
infancy, “transcended IRA tribal councils.” 219 The NCAI hoped to capitalize on the
changing dynamics of Indians in America by emphasizing both tribal and individual
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rights for Native Americans. The NCAI did not have a single cause, however. Some
members lobbied the council to help decrease the power of the BIA over tribes, and
others hoped to legitimize tribal hiring of attorneys, while many championed Indians’
civil rights. 220 Secretary of the APC, John Rainer (Taos), communicated with and
directed policy for the NCAI, becoming in 1950 its first executive secretary. And while
Rainer and Paisano worked together for the APC, their roles representing separate
organizations with different agendas shaped their conceptions of leadership at home.
By 1950, the NCAI was advocating a “fundamental change in federal Indian
policy,” which focused on curbing the authority of the BIA. 221 Yet NCAI members did
not necessarily agree on what this meant. For example, in early 1940, the NCAI accused
John Crow (Cherokee), the superintendent on the Mescalero reservation who advocated
IRA tribal structures, of interfering with the tribe’s self-determination. As executive
secretary of the NCAI, Rainer charged the BIA of paternalism and deliberately restricting
the self-determination of the Mescaleros. Rainer and others in the NCAI felt that tribes
organized around IRA constitutions became pawns of the BIA, and he vented his
disagreement with their refusal to reprimand Crow. Paisano, on the other hand, felt that
special interest groups had used this situation to manipulate the NCAI into attacking the
BIA, and, in particular, an Indian representative (Crow) of the bureau. 222 While this
narrative is complicated, importantly this event and the divide in opinion between
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Paisano and Rainer clearly demonstrates the fragmented nature of national and Pueblo
Indian politics at midcentury. 223
In these early postwar years, the BIA expressed “widely divergent definitions” of
Indian policy. 224 Similarly, the NCAI also experimented with different goals and tried to
establish an identity as an organization. In Pueblo life, too, the confusing state of Indian
affairs restricted Paisano and the APC from making strong commitments to threats and
projects. Paisano’s connections to the BIA, too, surely influenced his feelings toward the
NCAI’s anti-BIA policy, for many Pueblo leaders and communities relied on and
supported the continued assistance of the BIA. Thus, the leadership of Tafoya and then
Paisano in many ways mirrored the transitions occurring in postwar America and Indian
Country.
Over the following decade, the leadership of Martin Vigil began to change the
policies and format of the APC. In 1952, the highly experienced Vigil, at the age of fiftysix, accepted his election as chairman of the APC. Serving until 1955, he was reelected in
1957, and ultimately filled the office until 1964. Born in 1896 in Tesuque, Vigil grew up
in his home Pueblo as well as spending considerable periods of time in Anglo America.
With only a limited education at St. Catherine’s Indian School in Santa Fe, Vigil spent
his teenage years working on movie sets in Hollywood, in mines in Cerrillos, New
Mexico, and on rail yards in New Mexico and Colorado. 225 In 1912, at the age of only
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sixteen or seventeen, Vigil began attending APC meetings. 226 He remembered that during
this time, there was “hardly any cooperation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” In fact
Pueblo elders were “suspicious of the BIA and the government.” 227
Vigil had been elected chairman of the APC before 1952, but had declined the
position. In 1927, Vigil rejected his nomination as he was insecure about his ability to
articulate himself proficiently in English. He was selected again in 1938, but once more
declined the position, citing his lack of education. He felt that Pueblo men who had gone
to college, or at least completed high school, would be more intellectually qualified than
he was to govern the APC, given the need for the chairman to communicate with
outsiders. 228 Despite his lack of education, Vigil was continually active in Pueblo affairs.
After tearing down the fence posts at Tesuque and participating in the Bursum-bill
struggle in the 1920s, Vigil established a long and fruitful relationship with Collier. Vigil
traveled on Pueblo delegations to Washington, D.C., to Collier’s home near San
Francisco, and to New York to highlight the land and religious struggles of the Pueblos.
Once he assumed leadership of the APC, he carried with him forty years of experience
with the confederate council and a vast experience of working with outsiders.
Vigil’s tenure as APC chairman coincided with the most dangerous federal
legislation of the twentieth century: the termination policies of the early 1950s.
Beginning in 1953, federal Indian policy under President Dwight D. Eisenhower became
“rigorously aimed at quickly assimilating Indians into American society” by terminating
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the trusteeship of the federal government over Native American tribes. 229 The
Eisenhower administration installed a commissioner of Indian affairs who was keen to
liquidate the federal government’s trusteeship of Indian tribes “just as rapidly as
possible.” 230 Glenn L. Emmons, a banker from Gallup, New Mexico, was previously
known to the APC and the council did not support his nomination in 1953. At a meeting
in January 1953 at Santo Domingo, the APC had officially backed the New Mexico State
welfare director, Alva Simpson, for the position of commissioner. Simpson had promised
the Pueblos a greater voice in their own government. 231 Quite unsurprisingly, Emmons’s
hostility toward tribal organizations made him a national “focal point of tribal criticism,
as federal-Indian rapport suffered.” 232 Vigil remembered this period as “when everything
was going haywire.” 233
Termination represented a severe threat to the existence of the Pueblos as tribal
and political entities. Wikinson deems the midcentury attack on tribes “a relentless
political oppression.” 234 Termination began in earnest when Congress passed House
Concurrent Resolution 108 in 1953 and continued with a series of measures to end the
federal responsibility towards all Native American tribes. In line with his policy of
cooperating with outsiders, Vigil made a conscious effort to build a relationship between
the APC and Emmons, who promised Vigil a policy of transparency regarding the
government’s intentions. When the federal government proposed Public Law 280 and the
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so-called Competency and Malone bills as part of the drive towards termination, Vigil
accused Emmons of backtracking on his promise to consult the APC on all relevant
matters. The APC vigorously opposed the measures. 235 The Malone bill would have
liquidated the BIA on a federal level, while Public Law 280 would have placed the
Pueblos under state control. Along with the competency bill, Vigil labeled these
proposals “the most ruinous in the black record of 150 years of broken promises by the
federal government.” 236 On 18 July 1953, the APC unanimously passed a resolution
stating the Pueblos were “not yet ready” to exist without federal assistance. Vigil
explained the APC’s opposition to Public Law 280, believing that the state of New
Mexico was “not able to provide facilities for education, health and other Indian
problems.” 237 In January 1954, Vigil appealed to Emmons to “stand up and fight for
us.” 238
Motivated by the potentially destructive impact of termination, Vigil led the APC
into a new era of Pueblo politics. Sando explains Vigil’s leadership philosophy as
“cooperation for progress.” 239 Vigil began routinely to invite outsiders to APC meetings
so that federal, state, and BIA officials were aware of Pueblo issues. “They won’t come
unless you invite them,” Vigil observed. He even established biannual meetings with
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Apache and Navajo delegates from New Mexico. Vigil claimed the Pueblos had a number
of “good friends that want to help . . . but we don’t let them know what is going on.” He
said that council elders gradually accepted the growing APC cooperation with the BIA,
Congress, the state government, and representatives of industry. 240 As a result of Pueblo
co-operation with the state of New Mexico during Gov. Edwin Mecham’s administration,
1950–54 (and 1956–58), the state established the New Mexico Commission on Indian
Affairs in 1955. Vigil invited Charles E. Minton, the Commission’s secretary, to APC
meetings. According to Vigil, “he was a great big help . . . [and] everybody liked him.” 241
Vigil himself was named to the State Commission in 1955 as the influence of APC
leadership grew into state politics. 242
Vigil was equally concerned that APC meetings should become a forum for
political matters only—“outside of the religious, culture.” 243 He feared that religious
matters too often dominated APC meetings and hindered addressing crucial political
issues. Vigil was in no way unsympathetic to religious and traditional matters, and did
not want to “abolish” of “forget about it.” 244 Indeed he himself had worked hard to
protect the Pueblos’ right to dance in the 1920s. However, he believed that the APC
should function as a “face to face” organization to address “business from outside.” 245 He
recalled that eventually, council members “all understood” that these measures were
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necessary for the council to function effectively. Subsequently, the APC “never went
back to tradition,” and focused solely on external political matters instead. 246
During Vigil’s leadership of the APC, he also proposed increasing the executive
power of the chairman. Vigil announced to the APC, “I want for you people to give full
authority to your chairman, if the bill come[s] up in Washington, good or bad, let the
chairman speak to them and write a resolution on behalf of the All Pueblo Council.” Vigil
was concerned that the protocol of APC meetings, which required prior organization and
lengthy discussion, prevented communicating a Pueblo perspective to the nations capitol
or state government on pending bills that affected the Pueblo way of life. Learning from
the land controversy and termination policies, Vigil realized that, sometimes, the national
and state political process moved quickly. “We have got to watch out,” he warned. 247
As the APC joined the wider fight against termination, Vigil counted on the
cooperation of supporting organizations to protect Pueblo interests. The NMAIA—once a
relative foe to the APC—provided the APC with legal counsel to deflect the most
harmful aspects of termination. 248 More importantly, the NCAI then invited the APC to
an “Emergency Conference” to discuss the federal termination policies in February 1954.
Forty-three tribes were represented at the emergency summit in Washington, D.C. On 27
February, Vigil spoke on behalf of the APC and denounced the government’s plans for
termination. 249 Despite the opposition to termination, however, the federal government
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terminated the tribal status of over one hundred tribes nationwide. Yet the tribal and
inter-tribal resistance to termination and the logistical problems the government
encountered while implementing the measures stopped Congress from terminating all
Indian tribes. “Federal officials failed to comprehend the existing strength of Native
American cultures,” says historian Donald Fixico. 250 Organizations such as the APC and
NCAI proved crucial in limiting the impact of these destructive reforms. It is impossible
to know the tangible impact the APC had on the final outcome in the fight against
termination measures. Vigil’s willingness to work with others and form a political bloc in
opposition to termination, however, certainly contributed to the wider long-term defeat of
these policies.
Despite Vigil’s collaborative philosophy, the APC’s cooperation with outside
organizations, and the NCAI in particular, was conditional under his chairmanship.
Rainer was the secretary of the APC during Vigil’s first term and was elected chairman in
February 1955, serving two years in between Vigil’s two stretches. Rainer apparently put
pressure on Vigil and the APC to accept an NCAI-written constitutional by-law that
would have allowed the council to receive thousands of dollars in funding from the
NCAI. Vigil felt that as a nonprofit organization this was not appropriate for the APC.
Further, he claimed that the NCAI intended to manipulate the strength of the APC for
wider, pan-Indian causes: “they want to use all our [APC] rights and our help and our
authority and our power.” Vigil even accused Rainer of running the APC with NCAI
money.
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The Vigil-Rainer relationship was strained, and the issue of APC cooperation with
the NCAI was evidently a sticking point. Still, Vigil remarked that he considered Rainer
his “son.” “We got along alright,” he said, “but I am against the NCAI.” 251 While Paisano
had been reluctant to defer to the NCAI because of their hostility toward the BIA, Vigil
considered the NCAI an organization that represented Indians who had been more
explicitly affected by nineteenth-century removal and reservation policies. Whereas New
Mexico’s Pueblos remained in their (reduced) homelands and maintained much of their
sovereignty and tradition, the NCAI concentrated less on protecting traditional cultural
values than finding a role for Indians within America. This distinction led him to
conclude, “I don’t know what kind of culture you [the NCAI] have and if they are [real]
Indians [sic].” 252 Ultimately, Vigil wasn’t willing to concede any measure of APC
sovereignty to a national organization—Indian or otherwise.
On one occasion during Rainer’s chairmanship, Zuni Pueblo asked the APC to
mediate a factional dispute at the same time that an NCAI meeting was scheduled in
Washington, D. C. Rainer opted to go to Washington, while Vigil remained determined
to aid his Zuni brothers settle the disagreement. He told Rainer, “You promised those
people down there at Zuni, they need your help, they need our help.” And despite
suffering from stomach ulcers and arthritis, Vigil traveled to Zuni alone, listened to each
side’s grievances, and offered his counsel until 2 AM, when he helped resolve the dispute.
Shortly after this event occurred, Vigil was re-elected chairman over Rainer and presided
over the council for another six years. 253 While Vigil was often a willing inter-tribal
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delegate and Pueblo representative, then, he remained committed to Pueblo-related
problems and to maintaining the sovereignty of the APC.
In 1960, the Eisenhower administration brought its drive toward Indian
assimilation to Santa Fe, initiating the closure of Santa Fe Indian School (SFIS). Sending
Pueblo children to SFIS “had become a time-honored custom, especially among the
Pueblos north of Santa Fe.” Vigil vehemently opposed the proposal to replace the school
with a new Institute of American Indian Art (IAIA). By the 1950s, half of the SFIS staff
were local Indians. The school provided the Pueblo community both a place of education
for its children, and “a well-established network of communication with parents and
tribal officials.” The APC lay at the center of this network. 254 Vigil wanted Pueblo
children eventually to be incorporated into the public school system, yet IAIA provided
only a specialized education and was aimed at a national catchment area, leaving Pueblo
(and other Indian) children in New Mexico without a local secondary school. He was not
opposed to adding an art institute to SFIS, but felt there was still a real need to maintain
SFIS. Vigil appreciated the vocational skills Pueblo children learned at SFIS, noting that
after graduating from SFIS, “these boys can do anything, like painting, carpentry, driving
tractors.” Vigil labeled SFIS a “real darn good school” and it indeed produced many
university-educated Indians who rose to positions of authority within Indian Country in
the twentieth century—including Vigil’s successor. 255
The proposed IAIA divided both the Pueblo and non-Indian community, and Vigil
found only limited support in his objections to the project. Even those who had once
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cooperated with him disagreed with Vigil’s stance. Collier, for example, stated that
despite his “affection and a high regard for Martin Vigil, reaching from 40 years ago to
the present,” Vigil’s opposition to IAIA was “unwise.” 256 Similarly, Charles Elkus, a
California lawyer who aided the Pueblos in the 1920s as part of the AIDA, supported the
IAIA. Vigil appealed to Elkus: “Indian children need to learn how to read, write and
speak English . . . they don’t need and don’t want a fancy art school . . . We need Santa
Fe Indian School. We need education.” 257 Sally Hyer, a historian of SFIS, found that
Vigil had “difficulty obtaining consensus of Pueblo governors” because “some were
negotiating with county school boards for public schools on Indian lands” and others
apparently backed the integration of Indian students into public schools straight away. 258
Vigil even appealed to Indian Commissioner Philleo Nash to no avail. 259 Ultimately,
Vigil could not stop the tide of momentum and in the fall of 1962, SFIS was closed and
the new IAIA was established in its place. SFIS students had to transfer to public schools
or to Albuquerque Indian School, sixty miles away. 260
Shortly afterward, at the end of 1964, Vigil lost his battle for re-election as APC
chairman for the last time. Vigil had based his stewardship of the APC and Pueblo
politics on cooperation. His failure to obtain a consensus among the Pueblos and others in
New Mexico on retaining SFIS, he believed, led to his failure to secure reelection. “I
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have been a lonely man ever since,” he remembered, “‘cause nobody backed me, just a
few Indians.” 261
Wilkinson astutely observes that at midcentury, tribal leaders were largely
ineffective at dealing with American society. Similarly, he points out that tribal action
was still largely reactive at this time. Importantly, however, “ineffective or not, Indian
people did resist.” 262 As APC chairman, Vigil had a keen awareness of and dedication to
the history and tradition of Tesuque Pueblo, the Tewa family, and the Pueblo community
as a whole. Vigil appreciated that to maintain strength, the APC had to modernize. Yet he
remained wary of implementing institutional changes, as he did not wish to compromise
Pueblo tradition. He attempted to negotiate tradition and modernity for New Mexico’s
nineteen Pueblos, while he pushed for a cautious but deliberate policy of cooperation for
progress. Through all of his actions, he first and foremost protected Pueblo interests and,
most importantly, he continually advocated inter-Pueblo cooperation. In the twentieth
century, Indian Country relied on pragmatic leaders to direct tribal politics and negotiate
with outsiders. And while Tafoya, Paisano, and Vigil did not always achieve their aims,
the APC negotiated the tough conditions of the midcentury. Their combined effort meant
that when Vigil left office for the last time and made way for Domingo Montoya of
Sandia, he had established a template for the next generation of Pueblo leadership. Vigil
negotiated and protected the Pueblos from federal termination, and further confirmed the
essential role the APC played in maintaining Pueblo tradition while negotiating with the
outside world.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The All Indian Pueblo Council and Self-Determination: Civil Rights, Economic
Opportunity, and Educational Autonomy, 1962–1975

On 16 October 1965, representatives of the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico,
Sen. Joseph Montoya, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash gathered at
Santa Domingo Pueblo, New Mexico, to witness the signing of the first written
constitution of the AIPC. 263 The document formalized North America’s oldest
confederation, the political wing of the Pueblos, and indicated the future direction of the
council. The constitution also articulated the continued independence of the confederate
council and the solidarity between nineteen tribes who were still overcoming the
destructive period of the mid-twentieth century. The AIPC’s decision to sign a
constitution in 1965 was indicative of the council’s will to extend the self-determination
of the Pueblos in the latter half of the twentieth century.
While the AIPC evolved throughout the twentieth century, from the 1950s to the
1970s in particular, the AIPC began assuming more responsibilities and greater control of
Pueblo life, becoming the most important element of Pueblo government in Pueblo
negotiations with outside organizations. The AIPC utilized its historic and evolving
relationship with the federal government to battle the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act and
protect Pueblo sovereignty, to capitalize on federal War on Poverty funds, and to wrest
control of Pueblo education in New Mexico away from the BIA and into Pueblo hands. In
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all its negotiations, the AIPC was keen to protect the unique traditions and customs of its
peoples and it often lobbied for the Pueblos through a conviction based on their historic
independence from non-Indian society.
The election of Domingo Montoya to the chairmanship of the APC in 1964
generated further ingenuity in and evolution of the council. And while Vigil had
negotiated with a federal government and an Indian Office hostile to tribal authority,
Montoya could count on a relatively cooperative federal government that was gradually
discarding the policies of termination and providing new opportunities to Native
communities. In Montoya the AIPC had a chairman who battled tirelessly to build the
council into an influential and powerful institution that could effectively serve the
Pueblos’ interests on local, regional, and national levels.
The middle of the twentieth century “marked the all-time low” for the “tribal
existence” of Native Americans. 264 Not only did the federal government attack the
sovereignty of Indian nations, but this attack left Indian communities impoverished, illeducated, and unhealthy. Native Americans were expected to live twenty-five less years
than the average American, while unemployment on some reservations pushed 90
percent. 265 The situation on Pueblo homelands was not as desperate as many places in the
country. By 1964, 74 percent of the Pueblos nearly twenty thousand population still lived
in their Pueblos. Of the total Pueblo population in cities and on reservations, 28 percent
of Pueblos were unemployed. 266 In the villages, unemployment ranged from 24–31
percent. Vlasich estimates that three-quarters of Pueblo workers remained farmers. Still,
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compared to wider America, the Pueblos faced a battle from birth to achieve economic
and educational parity. By the end of the 1950s, the federal government was softening its
approach to Native tribes. And in 1961, Congress approved Philleo Nash—an
anthropologist opposed to the idea of termination—as commissioner of Indian affairs.
Despite signs that federal policy was moving away from termination, however, it was not
until the very end of the 1960s that Congress officially renounced the destructive policy.
Within, but not because of, this slight vacuum of Congressional policy toward
Indians grew a modern tribal sovereignty movement. Historians Daniel M. Cobb and
Loretta Fowler have suggested recently that Native institutions working on practical
solutions at tribal, intertribal, regional, and national levels played a crucial role in
revitalizing Native communities and heartlands. By the mid-1960s, Native American
leaders such as Montoya had vowed to end termination, battle to uphold treaty rights, and
establish tribes as sovereign nations within reservations. 267 Thus, while the Pueblos’ story
after the midcentury was in many ways unique—when compared to tribes who suffered
greater cultural destruction—this story should be understood in the context of a national
movement for tribal sovereignty.
As was the case with the council’s chairmen so often in the twentieth century,
Montoya was the most pivotal component of the APC during this period. Montoya’s
background as both a prominent member of Sandia Pueblo and as a citizen of U.S.
society equipped him with the tools to negotiate effectively on the Pueblos behalf.
Montoya was born on 5 August 1911, and was educated at Santa Fe Indian School
through the eleventh grade. Like Vigil, Montoya experienced life outside his home
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Pueblo and worked in the agricultural fields of South Dakota at the age of eighteen.
When Montoya returned to Sandia, he worked on his family’s farm and spent some time
trapping coyotes in the Sandia mountain foothills and the Rio Grande valley. He later
devoted fifteen years to the United States Soil Conservation Service before he withdrew
his retirement funds to set up his own farm at Sandia. He was elected chairman of the
APC in February 1964. 268
One of the first measures Montoya tackled as chairman was to oversee the
ratification of the AIPC constitution that had been drawn up under Vigil’s leadership. As
the frequency of Montoya’s trips to Washington, D. C., increased, he believed that he
needed to prove without doubt that the APC represented all nineteen Pueblos of New
Mexico. Equally, Montoya felt that the Pueblos have a “common culture,” a “bond of
friendship and a feeling of mutual destiny,” but that in the early 1960s, they had “begun
to identify concrete approaches to the solution of our [common] problems.” 269 The
constitution was the logical formalization of the AIPC and a shared Pueblo vision of the
future.
After a series of drafted proposals, representatives of the nineteen Pueblos of New
Mexico met at Santo Domingo Pueblo on 16 October 1965 to sign the All Indian Pueblo
Council’s first written constitution. The preamble states that “By virtue of our sovereign
rights as Pueblo Indians and in accordance with our ancient customs and laws,” the
constitution aims to “promote justice and encourage the common welfare . . . foster the
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social and economic advancement of all the Pueblo Indians . . . preserve and protect our
common interests” and “inherent rights of self-government.” 270
Present at the ceremony was Commissioner Nash, who remarked that the
document would enable the “oldest deliberative body in the western world . . . to take full
advantage of help to be had today from the Office of Economic Opportunity.” 271 New
Mexico senator Joseph Montoya, also present, declared “the writing and signing of a
constitution is one of the supreme acts which a democratic people can perform,” and that
the document represented “an extension of the long and honored history of the pueblo
people.” 272 Later reporting on the constitution, the New York Times claimed that it
showed that the AIPC had “stepped more boldly and successfully into the twentieth
century than any other regional alliance of Indians.” 273 And according to Sharon O’Brien,
a sociologist of tribal governments, the signing marked the AIPC’s transition into a
“sophisticated administrative organization.” 274
Despite the apparent success of the occasion and the assertion of AIPC power in
the constitution, Pueblo sovereignty was already under threat in this period. In 1961
North Carolina’s Democratic senator Sam Ervin, a segregationist and strict
constructionist, headed a new congressional committee to investigate the position of
individual civil rights on Indian reservations. By 1965 he had concluded that the
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inconsistent and unspecified nature of the rights of Indians and non-Indians under tribal
governments required federal attention and regulation. On 22 June 1965, hearings in
Congress opened on the Ervin bills, which threatened to restrict tribal sovereignty all over
Indian Country. The AIPC, spearheaded by Montoya, led the defense of Pueblo
sovereignty in Washington, D. C., over the next few years. The AIPC was ultimately
unsuccessful in blocking the legislation, which passed in 1968, but the council won some
key concessions that protected many aspects of Pueblo tradition. 275
The core of Ervin’s measures were the sweeping proposals of bill S. 961. The
legislation stated that “any Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-government
shall be subject to the same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on the
Government of the United States by the United States Constitution.” 276 In the United
States, the 1960s were, in many ways, characterized by a continual struggle by ethnic
minorities in the Civil Rights movement to attain equality. Ervin and many officials in
the federal government failed to comprehend that Native people did not necessarily want
equality. To many tribes, sovereignty was the ultimate goal; securing it required battling
Congress and the state and federal courts.277
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Ervin’s proposals had the potential to strip all tribal governments of their
sovereign rights and posed practical questions about how tribes could afford to extend the
Bill of Rights to their people. Most importantly for the AIPC were the federal stipulations
for tribes to establish a jury system and provide legal counsel to all defendants. At the
opening hearing, chairman Montoya of the AIPC and Executive Director Vine Deloria Jr.
of the NCAI, protested most fervently against the Ervin bills. Montoya believed that “if
enacted into law, the legislation would bar the effective administration of the tribal
government.” On 22 June 1965, the AIPC passed a resolution that rejected five of the
eight bills put forward by Ervin. The AIPC protest represented by far the greatest
opposition to the measures heard in Congress. Significantly, Montoya declared that
“traditional means of tribal justice should be continued,” and obviously saw the proposals
as an infringement on the power of each Pueblo to govern its own people and regulate
their customs. 278 Following on Montoya, Deloria Jr. echoed many of his sentiments but
did not oppose as many measures: the NCAI approved of many of the measures as they
would modify Public Law 280.
When the amended Ervin bill returned in 1968, AIPC opposition to S. 961 had
forced the senator to embrace a crucial change that accommodated Pueblo tradition.
Ervin deleted the establishment clause of the first amendment from the Indian Bill of
Rights. Native governments would be free to promote their tribal religion. According to
legal historian John Wunder, this alteration was a direct response to the AIPC’s appeal
for their right to theocratic independence. 279 Despite considerable changes to Ervin’s
proposals, tribes would still be obliged to provide legal counsel to all defendants and
278
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introduce a system of trial by jury. During the hearings in March 1968, most tribes were
apparently satisfied by Ervin’s revisions; only the Pueblos continued to object to the
act. 280 Their unique history informed Pueblo resistance to the Ervin measures. The
Pueblos had generally dodged intrusions into their political structure under U.S. rule. The
Indian Bill of Rights of 1968 may not have been interpreted as particularly threatening
legislation to many tribes, especially when compared to the termination policies of the
1940s and 1950s. For the Pueblos, who had avoided the destructive impact of
termination, the Ervin measures were an unprecedented trespass on traditional Pueblo
sovereignty, which was unique in North America.
Reminiscent of APC action in 1922, the council organized an all-Pueblo
delegation to fight Senator Ervin’s proposals. The Congressional hearings in March 1968
were dominated by speeches from Pueblo representatives. No less than thirteen Pueblo
leaders were present in Washington (nine of them speaking), and Montoya was the first
witness to be heard. He declared, “As you can well understand by the attendance of the
Pueblo leaders present in this room, we consider these bills to be one of the . . . most
important measures confronting Indian people for the past several years.” Under an AIPC
resolution passed on 23 March 1968, he argued that the Pueblos were in a unique
historical position in North America, and requested that all Pueblos be excluded from the
provisions of Title I and Title II of the Ervin bills. Montoya stated that the “traditional
[Pueblo] way of life did not break down and disappear like that of most tribal groups.”
The AIPC considered the measures of the Ervin bills “highly objectionable,” because
they “tend to eliminate our traditional ways of attaining the basic objectives of justice and
280
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equality.” Montoya explained that Pueblo social structures already affirmed the spirit of
freedom in the Bill of Rights but believed that the practical implications of the proposed
legislation had the potential to destroy the Pueblo way of life. 281
The Ervin Bill was nonetheless signed into law a month later in April 1968. The
AIPC, however, remained defiant: “No federal agency is going to tell the Pueblos exactly
how their governments should be organized. This is a matter each Pueblo must decide for
itself.” The council lobbied its U.S. senators, Joseph Montoya and Clinton P. Anderson,
for a bill that would exclude them from the objectionable measures of the Civil Rights
Act. 282 Senator Anderson told the AIPC to “keep on with what you are doing.” He would
“seek an amendment to the bill exempting Indian pueblos from the portions affecting
Indians.” 283 Subsequently, Montoya and Anderson introduced bill S. 211 (and S. 2173) in
Congress. Because of the Pueblo-specific nature of Anderson and Montoya’s proposed
amendments, Ervin and his committee held the hearings in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
on 11 April 1969 to hear further Pueblo testimony. This time the Pueblos were joined by
prominent Mescalero Apache leader Wendell Chino, who was connected closely to
Pueblo leadership at this time. The Jicarilla Apache and Navajo tribes also submitted
written statements that supported the Pueblo position. Indeed the APC’s influence on
these tribes transformed their opinions on the matter from general agreement to
opposition.
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At this hearing, Montoya restated his concerns that the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act would “destroy the traditions . . . greatly weaken our governments,” and “impose
financial burdens” on the Pueblos. 284 When questioned directly by Senator Ervin,
Montoya was increasingly adamant that the Pueblos deserved exclusion because of their
historic political autonomy: “What happens to our sovereign rights, then? As you
remember, people, any community anywhere, cannot live for hundreds of years under
any system if the system is wrong for the people or for the community.” 285 Legal
historian Donald Burnett observed that the Pueblos were “obstinate . . . when faced with
the possibility of change imposed from the outside.” 286 Led by the AIPC, the nineteen
Pueblos put up an extremely robust defense of their historic sovereignty, arguing that
their threatened traditions, now under federal threat, gave legitimacy to their governments
and to the political and social organization of their communities.
This Pueblo defiance compelled Ervin to introduce two amendments to the Indian
Bill of Rights, though he refused to exclude the Pueblos from the act altogether. To the
dismay of the AIPC, these amendments were never ratified by the senate, all but ending
the AIPC’s defense of Pueblo sovereignty in this instance. The show of inter-Pueblo unity
led by the AIPC during this period, however, undoubtedly legitimized the work of the
council as an organized and powerful political institution. Individual Pueblos were rallied
to defend their interests, Senators Anderson and Montoya fought for the Pueblo cause and
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formed good relationships with the AIPC, and the federal government in Washington, D.
C., continually praised the AIPC for its well-orchestrated campaign.
In the 1970s the federal government interpreted the impact of the Indian Civil
Rights Act on tribal sovereignty. Juliana Martinez of Santa Clara Pueblo bought a suit
against her governor and Pueblo council, alleging that the Pueblo’s (gendered)
membership ordinance went against the equal protection provision of the Civil Rights
Act. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, and held in
favor of the Pueblo. The court concluded that, despite the Indian Civil Rights Act’s
attempt to regulate tribal sovereignty, the Federal government should not interfere with
the Pueblo’s “tribal autonomy and self-government.” In his analysis of the case, Vieno
Lindstrom states that the APC’s criticism of the Indian Civil Rights Act helped the court
decide in favor of tribal power. In many ways, Martinez strengthened the ability of
Pueblo councils to govern their own affairs and thus limited the potentially intrusive
elements of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 287
The political wrangling around the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act only constituted
a small volume of the total energies of the AIPC during this period however. While
defending Pueblo sovereignty, the AIPC also attempted to achieve economic selfsufficiency and to improve the economic situation of all nineteen Pueblos. When
Montoya was elected chairman in 1964, the AIPC had neither a central office nor any
means of income. Montoya almost immediately remedied this situation by permanently
moving the council to the central and urban location of Albuquerque. The AIPC had no
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office, telephone, chair, or any infrastructure when this move occurred. So the BIA
temporarily housed the council in the Southern Pueblos Agency building in Albuquerque.
Once the AIPC had established its new central location, Montoya applied for funds from
the Field Foundation to support the operations of the council for a year. The foundation,
providing funds to organizations that promoted civil rights and social change, granted the
AIPC nearly $25,000 in 1965 and the council received this support for the next few years.
This money initially allowed the AIPC to pay its chairman $8,000 a year for his services,
hire a secretary, maintain a telephone line, and subsidize travel costs. 288 Previously,
AIPC chairmen had not been paid for their services and this change marked a shift in the
efficiency of the organization.
The Field Foundation money was crucial to facilitating the growth of the AIPC,
but this money only supported the council itself, not the Pueblo people. After 1964, the
AIPC was able to apply for new federal funds made available under President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s War on Poverty programs. Johnson’s social policies of the 1960s aimed to
curtail the economic decline of minorities and revitalize impoverished communities.
Although they were not intended exclusively for Native communities, the newly
established Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and Economic Development
Administration (EDA) in particular, provided significant funds to tribes in the name of
economic development over the next decade. These offices handed funds directly to
tribes to administer on their own terms, sidestepping the paternalistic impulses and
administrative red tape of the BIA. Cobb writes, “For the first time since the United
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States colonized Native America, tribal governments administered programs for their
own communities.” 289
Cobb explains that the War on Poverty became a “critical component of a new
political dynamic in Indian Country,” and prompted a “nationalistic movement for tribal
self-determination.” 290 Historian and Native education specialist Margaret Connell-Szasz
has pointed to the significance of tribal leaders during this same period. Tribal leaders
became familiar with constructing a “convincing case for the needs of their people” and
learned “where the sources of political power lay, and they began to go directly to these
sources.” 291 Using the opportunities made available by the War on Poverty, Montoya
began utilizing the Pueblos’ historic and continually evolving relationship with the
nation’s capitol to increase Pueblo self-determination.
The OEO administered various Head Start, Job Corps, VISTA, and Community
Action Programs (CAP) within various impoverished Indian and, predominantly, nonIndian communities. Each aimed to promote and invigorate economic development at the
local level in a variety of ways. The AIPC and individual Pueblo governments
implemented Head Start programs, directed at pre-school children, in a number of
Pueblos. These were praised by Montoya for reversing trends and “breaking the tragic
cycle of ever-receding goals by our Indian students.” 292 The AIPC also employed Sophie
Aberle to oversee a Computer Assisted Instruction program in Isleta Pueblo from 1970
onwards, receiving $300,000 from the OEO in 1974 alone. An Indian CAP was
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administered through the University of New Mexico. It was designed “to provide
technical assistance for Indians in their efforts to better their social and economic
condition.” 293
The AIPC also frequently faced frustration when dealing with the OEO. In 1965
the council’s bid to secure funds for establishing an Arts and Crafts Guild was rejected by
the OEO. Similarly, its attempts to lure industries onto Pueblo lands were often thwarted.
In 1966 the OEO denied the AIPC funds for a Pueblo Indian Industrial Development and
Marketing Demonstration Project. Montoya frequently encouraged industry to come onto
Pueblo lands, taking a trip to New York City in March 1968 to address an industrial trade
show organized by the EDA, OEO, and NCAI. 294 Montoya believed that in order to
facilitate the economic development of Pueblo communities, curb Pueblo migration to
cities, and maintain cultural continuity, local employment opportunities were needed for
Pueblo workers, “to find productive jobs without totally abandoning their traditional
ways of life.” 295 Montoya did negotiate an industrial contract on Pueblo lands, but he did
so in his capacity as president of Sandia Indian Industries, Inc., in 1973. However, the
funding for this project came from the Small Business Administration (SBA), which was
not connected with War on Poverty programs. 296
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The AIPC could also negotiate with a second federal administrative body under
the War on Poverty in the 1960s. In 1965 Congress passed the Public Works and
Economic Development Act establishing the Economic Development Administration
under the secretary of commerce. The aim of the EDA was “primarily to fund public
works projects” in impoverished communities. 297 Unlike the OEO, the EDA had the
mandate to distribute grants for Public Works and Development Facilities—or
infrastructure crucial to economic development. Senator Joseph Montoya, good friend of
the AIPC, was one of only a few congressmen supportive of the Public Works and
Economic Development Act when it was drawn up in Congress. Montoya singled out the
Indian communities of New Mexico as potential beneficiaries from the EDA, stating that
“Acoma, Isleta, Laguna, Jemez, Jicarilla, Mescalero, Ramah, Santo Domingo, Zuni,
Santa Clara, and Navajo” communities would benefit from its passing. 298
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, federal cooperation, the support of Senator
Montoya, and EDA funds combined to create a home and base for the AIPC’s economic
and community development. Despite having its 1965 proposal for an Arts and Crafts
Guild rejected by the OEO, the AIPC still aspired to establish a home for practical Pueblo
training and a place to sell Pueblo goods. By the 1960s, the BIA-run Albuquerque Indian
School (AIS) had fallen into a state of disrepair, and the BIA initiated plans for the
eventual dissolution of the institution. As early as 1966 Montoya lobbied Secretary of the
Interior Stuart Udall, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert L. Bennett (Oneida) to
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sign the land over to the council. 299 And in June 1969, the BIA began what would
become a pattern in the 1970s when it relinquished around 11.6 acres of AIS land to the
AIPC. The land was “no longer needed for federal Indian School purposes,” and the BIA
assigned the land to the nineteen Pueblos for a “school or other public purposes.”300 The
AIPC took the unprecedented step of directly contacting President Richard M. Nixon to
thank him for giving the Pueblos a “spot of land to call our own . . . to form [a] more
cohesive organization which can work for the good of all the nineteen Indian Pueblo
communities in New Mexico.” 301
The AIPC drew up proposals to utilize the land, located near the heart of
downtown Albuquerque, for a modern all-Pueblo cultural center and immediately applied
for EDA funds under the provisions for a Grant for Public Works and Development
Facility. To enable the successful transfer of funds, tax free, the AIPC quickly acted to
form a nonprofit organization under the state of New Mexico. At a meeting four days
after the council was handed the Indian school land, the AIPC unanimously voted to form
the “All-Indian Pueblo Council, Inc.,” to receive and administer the EDA funds. 302 On 30
June 1969, the AIPC signed the necessary Articles of Incorporation and the AIPC, Inc.,
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was established. The purpose of the organization was to “centralize [AIPC] efforts to
advance [the] educational, economic, and social position of all the Pueblo Indians.” 303
The AIPC simultaneously submitted proposals to the EDA for a Pueblo Cultural
Center. It was hoped that the cultural center would act as a “central showplace for
[Pueblo] culture and history,” via a museum, information center, arts and crafts
workshops, sales rooms and outdoor theater. 304 Equally important was the hope that the
cultural center would provide “an opportunity for potential Indian leaders to acquire the
skill and experience needed to develop business enterprises on their own reservations.” 305
The hopes for the IPCC were ambitious. Not only would the nineteen Pueblos have an
inter-Pueblo home, but their unity evident in the facility would provide economic support
to the tens of thousands of Pueblo people in New Mexico.
The battle to secure this facility was far from straightforward. Over two years
after initial plans were submitted, the council had to overcome a zoning restriction
attached to all EDA grants. Bernalillo County, the location of the proposed IPCC, was
not zoned as a community eligible for EDA funds. After a great deal of negotiation on the
part of Senator Montoya, the EDA re-designated the AIPC’s 11.6 acres ‘Restricted Indian
Land’ to fulfill the relevant EDA requirements. Further problems arose when the AIPC’s
ambitious plans for a traditional Pueblo-style building and business center increased
construction costs to $2.4 million. 306 Perhaps more importantly, some members of the
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Denver office of the EDA were not convinced that all nineteen Pueblos supported the
project, and funds were withheld until the EDA was satisfied that the AIPC had the full
support of all nineteen Pueblos. The AIPC scaled back plans for the IPCC, and Senator
Montoya pushed the EDA to endorse the revisions. In June 1972, the EDA approved a
grant of $1,640,000 for the IPCC—the cost of the entire facility. 307
Despite further delays, construction of the IPCC went ahead and on 28 August
1976, seven years after it was initially proposed, the AIPC invited Senator Montoya to
open the newly completed center. Montoya declared that the IPCC would be “another
piece in the growing economic development of the Indian Pueblos . . . a beacon for the
future as well as a place for reverence for the past.” 308 The EDA had become infamous
for the political and bureaucratic squabbling that accompanied its grants. Even Domingo
Montoya commented that AIPC enthusiasm for the EDA lagged as “everything became
mired in the traditional bureaucratic red tape,” unlike the seemingly fluid funding from
the OEO. 309 But the Pueblos benefited enormously from the hard work of the AIPC and
Senator Montoya in negotiating the convoluted restrictions of EDA funds. Senator
Montoya in particular became a close friend of the AIPC during this time and continually
backed its initiatives. His cooperation with the AIPC and his position on the Senate
appropriations committee were vital to the success of the IPCC project.
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The EDA spent only $150 million on Indian projects between 1966 and 1975,
making the AIPC’s grant of $1,640,000 all the more remarkable. 310 The EDA’s grant
built a permanent home for the AIPC on its very own, semi-sovereign, 11.6 acres of allPueblo land in central Albuquerque and facilitated a new era of economic development
for Pueblo people and businesses.
During the time the AIPC was striving to establish itself economically, it was also
working to improve the educational circumstances of the Pueblo people. Since the 1870s,
the BIA had managed federal Indian education. In the 1960s and 1970s, the AIPC began
to wrestle gradually from the BIA its control of Pueblo education. Significantly, the
AIPC did not overtly reject BIA assistance and was actually keen to maintain a close
relationship with the bureau. In so doing, the AIPC used the BIA to establish its own
local forums of power. By 1968, for instance, the AIPC had coordinated Advisory School
Boards at each of the twelve BIA schools on Pueblo lands, “greatly increase[ing] the
participation of Pueblo members in making the decisions that affect their children.” 311
And in 1965, the BIA proposed the construction of a new $13 million Indian-only high
school to replace the deteriorating Albuquerque Indian School. The AIPC was quick to
realize the potential for the Pueblo community in such a project, and after negotiations
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash, the AIPC amended a plan to the
proposals that a substantial section of the school be designated as a “much needed post-
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high school vocational and technical education” facility for “Indian youth in the
Southwest.” 312
Domingo Montoya was adamant that a technical vocational facility was necessary
because Pueblo students were neglected in public schools and consequently missed out
on the opportunity to attend institutions of higher education. 313 Montoya damningly
suggested that public schools “thwart [Pueblo] desires without giving us anything in
return,” claiming that because of the compensation public schools received for enrolling
Indian students, they were only “interested in money.” Further, Montoya argued that
public schools essentially segregated Indian students “in fact,” if not intentionally. 314 The
president of the New Mexico Federation of Teachers, Thord C. Nilson, agreed with
Montoya, stating that there was a “tragic de facto segregation of a great majority of
Indian pupils” and that a technical vocational facility was necessary “to meet [the] special
needs” of Indian pupils let down by public schools. 315 Once the AIPC’s plan for a posthigh school technical facility was announced, the project gained the support of many
sections of Indian and non-Indian Albuquerque society. The previous BIA plan to replace
AIS directly had been hugely unpopular among residents of the Albuquerque community.
In particular, opponents wanted to end the institutional segregation of Indian students. 316
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The council hoped to re-establish a degree of Pueblo control over its students’
education through its negotiations with the BIA. Because of the AIPC’s revisions, plans
quickly evolved calling for the creation of a separate and brand new higher-education
institution administered by the BIA but, crucially, governed by a coalition of New
Mexican Indian interests, including the Pueblos. Senators Montoya and Anderson lobbied
Congress on behalf of New Mexico’s Native communities and the Senate appropriated
$13 million for the project in 1966.
During the late 1960s, Native communities throughout the United States began
pushing for native-controlled higher-education institutions. According to Connell-Szasz,
tribal colleges are “committed to the communities they serve” and are “responsive to
local needs.” 317 This sensitivity to the local community is partly due to organizations
such as the AIPC, which planned innovatively for the needs of the local Indian
community while they cooperated with outside organizations such as the BIA. In 1971,
the Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI) was established on Albuquerque’s
west mesa, on lands that had once served as the AIS dairy farm. Three years earlier, the
Navajos opened the first tribal college in the United States in Arizona. 318 Crucially for
the AIPC, their negotiations with the BIA in the planning of SIPI brought a degree of
Pueblo control over Indian youth and allowed the council to establish itself as a body
with political influence in the Albuquerque area.
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Whether the AIPC was ultimately successful in regaining a semblance of control
over Pueblo education through SIPI, however, is rather unclear. Almost immediately, and
in the context of similar protests across America in the 1970s, SIPI became a “hotbed of
student discontent.” 319 Native educators were apparently not consulted on course
curriculum and the BIA essentially controlled the direction of the college. Campus unrest
culminated in 1975, when forty students from SIPI joined twenty-five members of AIM
to occupy sections of the college in an attempt to assert Native control over the
institution. Apparently indignant, and feeling challenged by an outside organization
“speaking on behalf of the AIPC,” then chairman Delphin Lovato of Ohkay Owingeh
Pueblo told AIM to “stay the hell out of here.” 320 The AIPC’s experience with SIPI was
an early venture in establishing Pueblo influence over the education of its children, but
the enterprise was by no means a success. Despite upheaval at SIPI, however, the council
gained invaluable experience in planning with the BIA and preparing for further control
of Pueblo education.
One of the cornerstones of the AIPC’s education committee policies during the
1960s and 1970s was its emphasis on the importance of higher education for Pueblo
people. In 1969, the council took control of the BIA’s Pueblo scholarship program.
Higher-education enrollment numbers subsequently “began to skyrocket.” By the end of
1974, around six hundred Pueblo students were receiving AIPC scholarships. 321 Once
more, the AIPC was able to prize a degree of control away from the BIA and establish
greater influence over the education of Pueblo children.
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In 1975, recognizing the changing tide of Indian self-determination, Congress
passed the American Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. This act
opened up to Native communities an array of new opportunities. The legislation enabled
tribes to apply for federal funds to administer tribal programs on reservations.
Significantly, the Self-Determination Act, along with other 1970s legislation for
American Indians, marked the final end of termination and began to reinvigorate the
tribal structures. 322 Taking advantage of the new legislation, the AIPC took further steps
to control Pueblo education by successfully contracting the running of Albuquerque
Indian School in 1977. Using Public Law 93-638 of the self-determination act, the AIPC
became the “first tribal organization to take on direct responsibility and control of a
Bureau [of Indian Affairs] school.” 323 And, in 1981, when the Albuquerque Indian
School was eventually decommissioned, the AIPC moved the school to Santa Fe, New
Mexico, and reestablished Santa Fe Indian School at the expense of the IAIA. 324
By the early twenty-first century, the AIPC-administered SFIS was a model of
success in New Mexico and admired across Indian Country. In 2005 the AIPC unveiled
the school’s new $50 million building complex to its seven hundred students. The
graduation rate is nearly 100 percent and 80 percent of graduates go on to higher
education. In 1976 Chairman Del Lovato placed Joseph Abeyta of Santa Clara Pueblo in
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charge of the school. Abeyta contined to lead the school into the new millennium. In
2000, President William J. Clinton transferred the SFIS land to the AIPC, giving the
council another area of sovereign, all-Pueblo land in an urban area. 325 The AIPC’s
struggles to influence Pueblo education were not always successful, but in the 1960s and
1970s the council gradually displaced the BIA as the chief administrator of Pueblo
education and increased tribal control of the education of their children.
By 1971, Domingo Montoya had served the maximum term of six years allowed
any AIPC chairman, and Benny Atencio (Santo Domingo) was elected as his
replacement. In the mid 1970s, chairman Del Lovato reorganized the AIPC. The council
had grown into “an enterprise with over two hundred employees and a budget of $6
million.” 326 So Lovato reorganized the council to focus on lobbying at the state level, to
take advantage of its growing regional influence. The council then began publishing a
newspaper and broadcasting a Pueblo radio station as part of the plans of its new
communications committee. 327
In the mid to late twentieth century, then, the AIPC acted as an inter-Pueblo
vehicle that provided New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos with a vociferous voice during a
tumultuous but occasionally optimistic period of time. Despite many setbacks, such as the
ultimate passage of the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, the Pueblos were able to reassert
control over their childrens’ education and extend their economic self-sufficiency through
the AIPC. By mobilizing politically via the AIPC, inter-Pueblo unity protected elements
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of Pueblo sovereignty and thus maintained a degree of continuity of tradition. The AIPC
understood the Indian Civil Rights Act as an attack on the Pueblos’ right to selfgovernment within nineteen small communities in New Mexico. The AIPC then took full
advantage of the changing federal commitment to tribes by transferring economic
opportunities into institutions that helped the Pueblos increase their sovereign rights.
Further, the AIPC became the first Indian institution to use the Self-determination Act to
administer a school and thus begin controlling Pueblo education. The importance of
Indians educating their own is noted by Della Warrior (Otoe-Missouria), who states that
the “survival of our communities and of our respective cultures” depends on the “control
of the education of our young people.” 328
“The Indian revival of the second half of the twentieth century,” writes
Wilkinson, “deserves to be recognized as a major episode in American history.” 329
Native American leaders such as Vigil and Montoya helped the Pueblos to survive the
menacing atmosphere of the mid-century and then flourish during the 1960s and 1970s.
As demonstrated here, the movement for modern tribal sovereignty was not particularly
eye-catching. The AIPC had few high profile moments on which to hinge their fight to
increase their sovereignty. Instead, the AIPC relied on their constitution, which itself was
based on decades of activism, as a practical guideline to articulate their plight and to
change its course. Despite fighting in the political darkness, Native American institutions
such as the AIPC achieved great success in the mid-to-late twentieth century in protecting
tribal cultures and increasing their ability to negotiate for themselves. This success is
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particularly remarkable considering how relatively few people the APC represented, on a
national level. In 1911, the AIPC wrote, “We have organized into a federation of tribes
and have had there [sic] meetings which have resulted in a great good to us all. We study
our condition from every point of view and we believe we have inaugurated a new
upward movement which all New Mexico, white and Indian, will feel.” 330 Some sixty
years later, the AIPC could feel some satisfaction that their movement for sovereignty
had, indeed, been felt across New Mexico.
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CONCLUSION

Today, the AIPC continues to represent the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico, and
beyond. The organization has added considerably to its responsibilities to the Pueblo
people, further widening its scope of operations. In April 2006, the AIPC’s new, forprofit wing, The Indian Pueblos Federal Development Corporation, completed the
construction of the Pueblo Center Business Complex on the old AIS land adjacent to the
IPCC. In an ironic twist, the AIPC-owned building now hosts some Albuquerque offices
of the BIA, reversing the historic roles of tenant and landlord. 331 The AIPC has also
recently been mired in controversy over their decision to destroy the old buildings at
Santa Fe Indian School in July 2008. Responding to critics who resented the decision to
tear down such a historically rich structure, an SFIS spokesman said merely that the
school was exercising its “sovereign authority.” 332 And on 19 November 2009, the AIPC
welcomed a new Pueblo into its organization: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo of El Paso, Texas.
The people of Ysleta del Sur had previously left the northern Rio Grande Valley during
the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, when displaced Tiguas retreated south with the Spanish. By
re-embracing the Ysleta de Sur, the AIPC was in many ways completing a political
confederation that existed over three hundred and fifty years ago.
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“Today if you go to visit a tribal headquarters,” writes Della Warrior, “you will
see Indian people running their own governments in control of nearly all the services
these provide. But it was not always that way.” 333 When the AIPC began fighting against
incursions onto their land in the 1910s, the very existence of a Pueblo land base was
under threat and the Pueblos relied heavily on the Indian Office to maintain their
economic and educational survival. Over the next sixty years, the AIPC fought a variety
of battles on behalf of its Pueblo constituents in order to protect the continued
sovereignty of the Pueblos to govern themselves. In the process, the AIPC began
negotiating a place for the Pueblos to control aspects of their life. And while neither
Pueblo nor American society remained static during this time, the Pueblo people
increasingly charged the AIPC with participating actively in American political society,
so that traditional elements of Pueblo life could continue.
The AIPC understood its many twentieth-century battles as threats to the historic
sovereignty of the Pueblos. When planning on a course of action to approach land and
water battles; threats to the validity of the AIPC; federally imposed policies including
assimilation, the IRA, termination, and self-determination; through to economic
development and educational independence, the AIPC’s first priority was protecting and
extending the Pueblos’ right to govern themselves.
The story of the AIPC during this period is important because it helps us
understand the wider narrative of the movement for tribal sovereignty in the twentieth
century. Many histories have focused on the pan-Indian nature of Native American
stories in the twentieth century. And while the AIPC is itself an inter-Pueblo
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organization, the aims of the council were tribal in nature. The AIPC thus illustrates how
Indian institutions at this time did not necessarily abandon their tribal structure, and the
Pueblos first and foremost considered themselves tribal Indians. The AIPC’s resistance
to assimilation, integration, and termination, then, was an assertion of the Pueblos’ right
to represent themselves as sovereign, historic entities. Certainly the movement for tribal
sovereignty that occurred throughout Indian Country had relied on inter-tribal
cooperation. But the fact the AIPC was a part of this movement shows that inter-tribal
cooperation did not mean surrendering a tribal identity. 334
For the AIPC, their insistence on protecting their sovereign rights was based on
their historic independence apart from American society. Yet AIPC leaders realized that
in order to ensure the Pueblos could run their own affairs independently from the federal
government, the AIPC had to negotiate for the Pueblos a space to function within
America. Refusing to enter into dialogue with federal and state governments was simply
not an option. Instead, mastering political negotiations and networks within Indian affairs
and wider political circles proved the most effective use of AIPC energies. The AIPC
often embraced non-Indian cooperation, as was the case with Collier. They also shunned
those people and organizations they considered hostile to Pueblo sovereignty. Making
these pragmatic choices within political networks increasingly allowed the AIPC to
protect the Pueblos, until they were in a position to appropriate power once held by
federally based institutions, and begin acting as a source of tribal power.
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Despite the importance of co-opting non-Indian interests in the twentieth century,
the AIPC’s biggest concern, and its greatest strength, was maintaining and strengthening
the unity of the Pueblos themselves. Certainly the Pueblos have historically engaged in
long-terms conflicts between one another. In the twentieth century, however, the need to
work in unison to fend off the threats of modern America necessitated that the Pueblos
work together to find practical solutions to problems common to all. Within this time
frame, the Pueblos were not always united on every issue within and between Pueblos.
Yet the continued existence of the AIPC demonstrates that the Pueblos realized they must
hold a sentiment of unity in order to protect the culture they held most dearly. The
twentieth century story of the AIPC illuminates the continued tribal functioning of the
Pueblos, their pragmatic approach in negotiations with outsiders, and their long-term
fight to protect their historic sovereignty.
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